Sanjō Sanetsumu was one of those who took part in the court’s deliberations. From the second month of Kōka 3 (1846) to the twelfth month of Ansei 5, the climax was senior councilor Manabe Akikatsu’s visit to the palace. That morning, Kyoto was hit by a sudden shower and thunder.
On September 5, the shoshidai, who was responsible for the security of Kyoto, issued a document stating that it would be convenient in every way to complete the shogun’s investiture ceremony quickly. Following the precedents of Tenmei and Kaei, it also requested that the matter take the form of an order issued from the palace rather than a request made by the Kantō. The request was that the decision be made within the year, and that the order of conferring rank and office follow the precedent of Yūtokuin in Kyōhō 1. Meanwhile, the Righteous Faction in Kyoto was prepared to delay the decision. Tokutomi Sohō writes that they were using it as a bargaining chip to make the Kantō accept the court’s thinking.
Takatsukasa asked whether a perfunctory reply would suffice given the times, and submitted that it should be accepted while leaving some room for implication. Ichijō Tadaka, Sanjō Sanetsumu, and Nijō Nariyuki held the same view. Tokutomi Sohō writes that it is not hard to see the opinions of Kobayashi Yoshisuke and others behind this. However, the conclusion reached was that the order would be issued exactly according to precedent, without leaving any room for implication.
The reason was that the warrior side appeared to have been acting roughly of late. The judgment was that if the palace said something out of the ordinary, it might again be treated roughly. Tokutomi Sohō records that the Kantō’s intimidation made Kyoto tremble even before it was actually carried out. On the 25th, he was appointed Inner Minister and shogun, and the permissions for the accompanying troops and carriages were all granted according to precedent. Manabe’s visit to the palace had been scheduled for the previous day.
On that day, there was no audience with the emperor, and Manabe returned after merely receiving a cup of sake. Tokutomi Sohō views the reason given, that the emperor had a slight cold, as probably a pretext for not meeting him. Nakayama Tadayasu wrote that it was frightening to hear that thunder had rumbled 4 or 5 times that morning with lightning strikes. The audience lasted about 3 hours, from 4 p.m. to 7 p.m., with neither the court’s liaison officer nor the shoshidai present. Nakayama also recorded that the realm was already at a time of ruin, a thing to be grieved and lamented.
Manabe reported to the Kantō dated the following day, the 25th, and compiled what he had stated in a separate document. The gist was that now was not the time to fight, and that for the time being they should remain on good terms and wait for the day when preparations were complete. He also stated that while signing without waiting for the emperor’s permission was regrettable, it was a small matter before the greater cause. Furthermore, he went so far as to add the forecast that as trade continued, the other side would come to understand Japan’s circumstances and eventually come to respect and follow it. Tokutomi Sohō dismisses this as a wildly mistaken daydream, an empty shot with no substance.
From the circumstances behind the one-month delay in the visit to the palace to the long statement delivered before a limited audience, all this can be followed through the words preserved in the Hikurōdo Diary, Nakayama Tadayasu’s record, and the Chūkōki, together with Tokutomi Sohō’s commentary.
From early morning, Kyoto was struck by a sudden shower, and thunder rolled.Original
At the hour of the snake, just before ten in the morning, the sky finally cleared.OriginalOriginal
That day, the senior councilor Manabe Akikatsu entered the palace for the first time.Original
He was accompanied by the shoshidai Sakai Tadaaki and the Kantō envoy, the master of ceremonies Yura, Shinano no kami.OriginalOriginal
There was no audience with the sovereign.Original
The hikurōdo diary records: “No audience was granted when the appointed time came.”Original
This means that, when the moment finally arrived, no audience was granted.Original
Manabe received only the imperial cup, and returned to Tsuruma.OriginalOriginal
Manabe arrived in Kyoto on the 17th day of the 9th month.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that the pretext given was that mourning for the previous shogun had not yet ended.OriginalOriginal
The regent replied that either day would be acceptable.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryTokutomi Sohō writes that choosing this day was by no means a coincidence.OriginalOriginal
The Court’s Moves Concerning the Shogun’s Investiture
Regarding the shogun’s investiture, the court’s policy had shifted more than once during the ninth month.OriginalOriginal
On the 5th day of the 9th month, the shoshidai submitted a petition.Original
It states that the ceremony of the shogun’s investiture “should be concluded as early as possible, for that would be convenient in every respect.”Original
The meaning is that finishing as soon as possible would be convenient in every regard.Original
An attached document requested that, following the precedents of Tenmei and Kaei, the form should be one in which the imperial court itself issued the command rather than the Kantō petitioning for it, and further that the decision on the investiture be made within the year.Original
It further requested that, following the precedent of Yūtokuin in the 1st year of Kyōhō, the rank certificate and edict for senior second rank, provisional major counselor, be received before the investiture, and that appointment as Inner Minister follow afterward.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryTokutomi Sohō states that the Righteous Faction in Kyoto sought to delay the investiture, using it as a bargaining chip to make the Kantō accept the court’s wishes.OriginalOriginal
The opinion was: given the present state of affairs, would a perfunctory reply really suffice?
“Let it be attached with a little nuance” — Takatsukasa submitted that it would be best to consent while leaving a slight margin of ambiguity.Original
Tadaka, Sanjō Sanetsumu, and Nijō Nariyuki also agreed with this.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that it is not hard to surmise that behind this lay the opinions of men such as Kobayashi Yoshisuke.OriginalOriginal
The meaning is that it was decided not to convey any special intent, but to issue the proclamation safely in accordance with precedent.Original
The court liaisons and court councilors who had been in seclusion all submitted their opinions as well, and the matter was decided by majority.OriginalOriginal
The reason is also recorded.Original
“The military side appears of late to be handling matters in an extremely violent manner.”Original
Since the warrior houses seemed of late to be acting with great violence in their handling of affairs, it was feared that if the court said anything even slightly different from the usual, it might again be treated violently.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō records that the violent might of the Kantō chilled the hearts of Kyoto even before it was actually exercised.OriginalOriginal
Just as the Kantō Had Requested
Thus matters turned out exactly as the Kantō had requested.Original
On the 25th, he became Inner Minister and Shogun, and the investitures for a mounted guard, military insignia, and ox-drawn carriage were all carried out exactly according to old precedent.OriginalOriginal
The court councilors’ records state that Nariyuki departed on the 15th day of the 11th month, Tadafusa on the 12th, the court liaisons together with Chikayoshi and others on the 16th, and Eisuke and Haruo on the 17th.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryTokutomi Sohō writes that the Kantō won victory on the matter of the shogun’s investiture as well.Original
Manabe’s visit to the palace was placed on the day before this victory.OriginalOriginal
As the Kantō’s formal gift, fifty rolls of damask and two hundred bundles of onaka were presented.Original
Each was presented together with an inventory document.OriginalOriginal
The same record states, “As His Majesty was feeling a slight cold, no audience was granted.”Original
The meaning is that because he was feeling a little unwell with a cold, there was no audience.Original
Tokutomi Sohō considers that this “cold” was probably a pretext for declining the audience.OriginalOriginal
Nakayama Tadayasu’s record is more urgent in tone.Original
At the end of the hour of the hare, around seven in the morning, thunder sounded four or five times.Original
On hearing that lightning had struck Furō-zushi, he wrote, “How fearful.”Original
Neither the court councilors nor the shoshidai were present.Original
From the hour of the monkey to the middle of the hour of the cock, that is, from four to seven in the afternoon, roughly three hours.OriginalOriginal
And Nakayama writes:Original
The realm has already reached the time of its ruin; it is a thing to be mourned and lamented.Original
Bōjō Toshikatsu came out late.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō notes that to pronounce ruin on the basis of a single palace visit is like something coming out of the blue.Original
But he also writes that this nonetheless shows how dangerous the court of that time regarded Manabe’s entry into the capital.OriginalOriginal
Manabe reported to the Kantō dated the following day, the 25th.Original
He reported that, as His Majesty was unwell and granted no audience, after receiving the imperial cup, in the lower hall of the Kogosho, in the presence of the regent, Major Counselor Hirohashi, and Major Counselor Madenokōji, he stated the matters set out in the attached document — the handling of the barbarians as instructed by the former shogun, the acceptance of the renewed imperial edict, the memorials of the various domains, the provisional treaty, and the unavoidable circumstances involved.OriginalOriginal
The Report Document, From Kanagawa to Hyōgo
Tokutomi Sohō says that the attached document, the so-called report document, is extremely long.Original
Sohō presents this from the Chūkōki of Hisatada.OriginalOriginal
The document begins its account from the time when Hotta Masayoshi, Bitchū no kami, went up to Kyoto to inquire into the imperial will.Original
In response to this, the various daimyo submitted their opinions.OriginalOriginal
Their content was this: the foreign countries overseas had invented steamships and opened up the art of navigation, so that “even the ends of the earth have become as near neighbors,” and their military systems and weapons had been tested in actual battle, so that the balance of strength now differed from the past.Original
The outlook was this: although the barbarians had until now been called the equals of birds and beasts, extraordinary men of talent had now emerged in each country, making them into great powers, so that there would be no hope of victory if hostilities were opened lightly at this point.Original
Even if we win a war once, if the various foreign countries harbor feelings of vengeance, attack our coasts on all sides, obstruct shipping and transport, and watch for the moment our national strength is exhausted to send their warships against us all at once, it is impossible to foresee what great calamity might result.Original
Therefore we should permit a provisional treaty, first allow trade at Kanagawa, Nagasaki, Hakodate, and Niigata, and after testing the gains and losses, open Hyōgo as well five or six years later.Original
In the meantime we should put in order the defense of the capital and of the coasts of the various provinces, testing this over roughly thirteen or fourteen years.Original
Once internal defenses are fully in order, the decision for peace or for war may then be left entirely to the Emperor’s own judgment, so it says.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō declares that the majority at the time was by no means in favor of opening war.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that although the answers of the three branch houses and the various daimyo were drafted to meet the shogunate’s request, even without such a request their true feelings detested war, feared war, and placed the avoidance of war above all else.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryAn interpreter calling himself “Harris, envoy of that country,” boarded the American ship that had come to Shimoda, and the ship entered the harbor at Kanagawa and sent out a letter.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō supposes that the shogunate’s leaders at the time must have fully believed this.Original
But Tokutomi Sohō writes that there is no doubt they were “taken in” by Harris’s intimidation.Original
Tokutomi Sohō also adds that Iwase Tadanari and others may have used this pretext as a good opportunity to achieve the substance of opening the country.OriginalOriginal
The empty cannon-fire of “the ancient days of holding the Three Han in our grasp”
The latter half of the document answers the four articles of the imperial edict.OriginalOriginal
The answer argues that against a single country, as in the Mongol invasion of the Kōan era, anything could be managed, but now, surveying the circumstances of the various countries overseas, no easy measure is possible, and so it advocates peace and friendship.Original
It goes on to say that if peace and friendship are maintained during the term before the treaty is renegotiated, the barbarians will come to understand the fact that “our country has no great abundance of goods, and it is in fact impossible for all to gain profit from it.”Original
That is, Japan has no great abundance of goods, and they will come to know the fact that not everyone can gain profit from it.Original
If that happens, they will come to cherish “the supreme virtue of the imperial lineage,” develop a will to revere and trust it, and some countries will even change the name of trade to tribute and bring goods.Original
If we consult with the submissive countries and control the disrespectful ones, then before many years pass, “the various barbarians overseas will be brought into our grasp, and we shall return to the ancient days of holding the Three Han in our grasp.”Original
That is, we can bring the overseas countries into our grasp and return to the ancient time when the Three Han were held in our grasp.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō dismisses this as a completely misguided daydream.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that it ignores the fact that trade causes production to flourish, and is nothing but empty, frivolous cannon-fire with no substance at all.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that before the Tenpō era this would have been nothing unusual, but as a memorandum submitted by shogunate officials in the tenth month of Ansei 5 (1858) it is outrageous, and Hotta Masayoshi would never have condescended to indulge in such preposterous talk.OriginalOriginal
The document concludes by saying that every human effort should be exhausted before the treaty revision thirteen or fourteen years later, and if peace or war still cannot be decided, they wish to consult the divine will of the Ise Jingū and decide accordingly.Original
“May the above matters be duly conveyed to the Emperor’s hearing.”Original
This is the closing request that the above matters be conveyed to the Emperor’s hearing.Original
Tokutomi Sohō characterizes this as the document in which Manabe, representing the shogun, stated to Regent Kujō the shogun’s reply to the imperial edict.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō says that though it is long, its gist is simple.Original
Now is not the time to open war; for the time being we should maintain peace and friendship and await the day preparations are complete; signing without waiting for imperial sanction is a matter of utmost trepidation, but it is a small matter set beside the great one—that is all, he says.OriginalOriginal
Three hours in the lower chamber of the Kogosho.Original
It began on a morning of thunder, and, with no audience before the Emperor’s countenance on the pretext of a chill, the long document was read aloud before the regent and the two court liaisons.Original
Tokutomi Sohō calls its content something that “seeks to gain the real benefit of imperial sanction through empty words that cost nothing.”Original
A court visit delayed by a month, a statement delivered to a limited audience, and a dream of the Three Han.Original
Were Nakayama Tadayasu’s four characters “lamentable and deplorable” directed at the thunder of that day, or at the document brought in together with a pair of folding screens?OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet Library| Source text | Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 41: The Ansei Purge, part 2 (1940). National Diet Library Digital Collections (PDM). PID 1228553 |
| Checked against | Ishin shiryō kōyō, vol. 1 (1937). PID 1046665 |
| Dates and names | All 1 dates in the text exist in the calendar for their year, and the Western years given alongside them agree. Of the 11 people named in the text, 9 also appear in Ishin shiryō kōyō, vol. 1. |
| English gates | 92 of 92 sentences passed the checks on the English text. |
This article is a reading of Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 41: The Ansei Purge, part 2. Tokutomi Sohō’s views are those of the 1920s and 1930s and may differ from current scholarship. The source text is a century old and may differ from current scholarship.
