Ii’s Policy of Intimidation ―― The Position of Ii, the Man Responsible for the Ansei Purge, Cowed into Silence ―― From the Third Month of Kaei 6 to the Third Month of Meiji 2

Summary

At the center of the movement from the 3rd month of Kaei 6 (1853) onward was Tokugawa Nariaki. Abe Masahiro, the senior councilor, somehow settled the difficult problems of that year and the next. Tokutomi Sohō writes that Ii could not handle Nariaki at all, whereas Abe had been able to handle him.

Abe had intended from the start to act for the good of the whole world. Tokutomi writes that Ii came forward with a policy of suppressing Nariaki. Crushing the movement to set up Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu, that is, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, as shogun. That was Ii’s policy. A chief minister (the one bearing final responsibility for government) who had put conflict in front. Tokutomi argues that if the side holding the reins of government is spoiling for a fight from the outset, the tangle can only grow worse.

It was not a peaceful thing that Nariaki and his party went to the castle on days other than those fixed for them. Tokutomi says that Ii did not raise the trouble from nothing, but fanned a disturbance that was already starting and let it run out of control. The same holds for the treaty: signing the agreement between Japan and the United States without waiting for the emperor’s permission may have been unavoidable. But no measures were taken to face the court. Dragging things out for months despite being pressed by Kyoto was not a wise move. Tokutomi sees the same fault in the tactic of intimidating the other side with loud words before Manabe Akikatsu, the domain lord of Sabae, had even gone up to Kyoto.

Tokutomi writes that the gap between the strength of the shogunate’s side and that of the men of resolve from the various domains was as great as that between wolf and sheep. The court, on which they relied, had nothing but a name and no real power, and the shogunate did not regard the isolated court as a difficult adversary either. Tokutomi records severely that the men of resolve mistook their wishes for reality, and the court ended up looking as if it had been sold out. Satsuma, Mito, Owari, Echizen, Tosa, and Chōshū. None of these domains moved at the critical moment, and they could not even save their own men who had come under suspicion.

On the 5th day of the 7th month of Ansei 5 (1858), Tokugawa Yoshikumi, the domain lord of Nagoya, and Matsudaira Yoshinaga, the domain lord of Fukui, were ordered into retirement and confinement. Tokugawa Nariaki was ordered into confinement, and Mito’s Tokugawa Yoshiatsu and Tokugawa Yoshinobu were ordered to refrain from attending the castle. Not a single person resisted, and everyone held their breath. Tokutomi records that only Shimazu Nariakira, the domain lord of Satsuma and father-in-law of the shogun Tokugawa Iesada, did not hold his breath. The court too, through the Konoe family, relied on him, and he resolved to respond, but he died of illness just before he could act.

After Nariakira’s departure, not a single daimyo rose up on his own to uphold the emperor’s wishes and contend with Ii. Satsuma exiled Saigō to a remote island, and Chōshū put Shōin in prison and sent him to Edo. Echizen handed Hashimoto Sanai over to the shogunate’s officials without laying so much as a finger on him in his defense. No domain responded to the efforts made to obtain the emperor’s command in Kyoto either. According to Tokutomi, this crackdown had nothing to do with whether an order existed or not. The script had been prepared early on by Ii’s close aides.

The course from the question of where to place the blame for the Ansei Purge to the silence that fell over the various domains after Shimazu Nariakira’s death can be traced through Tokutomi’s historical pen as set down at Sannō Sōdō in Ōmori on February 21, Shōwa 6.

Contents

The twenty-first day of the second month of Shōwa 6 (1931), Sannō Sōdō, Ōmori.Original
There it is recorded that the work of compiling history is proceeding in regular order.OriginalOriginal

Who bears responsibility for the Ansei Purge?OriginalOriginal

The policies of Abe and Ii

To a statesman, there is no such thing as a difficult matter.Original
Handling any troublesome problem skillfully is what makes a statesman a statesman.Original
Senior councilor Abe Masahiro stood at the height of the turbulent affairs of Kichū and Kōin from Kaei 6 (1853) into the following year, and in any case brought the situation under control.Original
Nariaki remained Nariaki.Original
There was no marked difference between him in Kaei 6 to Ansei 1 and him in Ansei 5 to 6.Original
Tokutomi Sohō’s view is that there is no reason Ii could not handle at all a man whom Abe had been able to handle.Original
Then why did things not go as intended?Original
Abe had intended from the start to act for the realm, to carry out the public good of the realm.Original
Ii, from the start, came forward with the policy of destroying Tokugawa Nariaki.Original
If Ii had any policy at all, it was one aimed at crushing the movement to install Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu, that is, Tokugawa Yoshinobu.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that he was not a minister who brought peace, but “a minister who came brandishing warfare head-on.”Original
That is to say, he was a minister who had held up war squarely in front of him.OriginalOriginal

Original text (Japanese)Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 42: The Ansei Purge, part 3, NDL image 19

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The original resolve of a quarrelsome stance

Differences in political views cannot be helped.Original
But reasons aside, there was no need, from the outset, to take a quarrelsome stance in opposing the rival faction.Original
Even granting that both sides in a quarrel share blame, Ii was the one in authority.Original
If the one in authority takes a quarrelsome stance and pushes forward against the related domains, the shogunal house, the outer lords, the hereditary vassals, the ministers of state of the court, and the shishi among the people, far from settling the situation, the confusion will instead become tangled like a skein of hemp.Original
Therefore, Tokutomi Sohō argues, the greater part of the responsibility should rest on Ii’s own shoulders.OriginalOriginal

Here Tokutomi Sohō brings in a metaphor.Original
He does not say that there was nothing lacking in the words and conduct of Nariaki and those around him.Original
There was also a side on which they themselves invited Ii’s interference and pressure.Original
But if they were a beehive, he says, “it was truly the doing of Ii himself who broke it open and sent the bees scattering in all directions.”OriginalOriginal

The unscheduled castle visit by Nariaki and the others was not moderate.Original
Ii did not stir up waves on level ground.Original
He whipped up the waves that were already rising, turning them into something that knew no bounds.Original
Tokutomi Sohō declares flatly that the root of this disaster lay in “Ii’s own original quarrelsome resolve.”OriginalOriginal

Original text (Japanese)Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 42: The Ansei Purge, part 3, NDL image 20

井伊は決して平地に波瀾を起したとは云はぬが、をば激揚して、洶涌、奔騰、底止する所を知らざらしむるに至つたのは、井伊其人の喧嘩腰の初一念が、その禍根であり、ふ可き餘地がない

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The same holds true for the treaty as well.Original
Signing the Japan-US treaty without waiting for imperial sanction may have been unavoidable.
But failing to take immediate steps to address the court’s wishes, and delaying for several months despite urging from Kyoto, was not a wise policy.Original
Tokutomi Sohō also views it as no means of pacifying the situation that, before Manabe Akikatsu, domain lord of Sabae, had even gone up to the capital, Ii adopted “first of all a policy of intimidating others with his voice.”OriginalOriginal

This movement and this incident were the “wedge,” that is, the starting point, of the Ansei Purge.Original
It could also be said, not without reason, that this was the consequence of their own actions on the part of the senior court officials and shishi headed by Mito.Original
But it was Ii’s quarrelsome stance that drove this momentum to a head, Tokutomi Sohō repeats.Original
He does not deny that the actions of the Ii faction often departed from the rules.Original
“But who was it that made them act in this way?”Original
His pen turns to the point that one must go further back to determine who was responsible.OriginalOriginal

Wolf and sheep

Next, Tokutomi Sohō examines Ii’s position.Original
On one side was the controlling power of the shogunate, with Ii at its head.Original
On the other were the men of resolve of the various domains, Confucian scholars, and drifting masterless men.Original
The difference in power between them was “like a wolf facing sheep.”OriginalOriginal

The one thing the men of resolve relied upon was the court.Original
But the court had no real power at all beyond its nominal authority.Original
Had men of real power upheld the court and confronted the shogunate, it would not have been easy, but against an isolated court the shogunate recognized no such great difficulty.OriginalOriginal

The court of that time ended up, as it were, “sold out by the men of resolve.”Original
There is no way the men of resolve had any intention of selling out the court.Original
But they confused hope with reality.Original
They made the wish of how they wanted things to be coincide with the fact of how things ought to be.Original
It was rather only natural that the court, not in touch with the actual circumstances, should trust them and believe that, when the moment came, it could rely on their power as backing.OriginalOriginal

Satsuma, Mito, Owari, Echizen, Tosa, Chōshū.Original
But when it truly came down to the critical moment, not one domain was willing to bring its full strength to bear in service of the court.Original
Far from acting for the court, they could not even save the suspects from their own domains, and had no choice but to leave their arrest and trial entirely to the shogunal officials.Original
Saigō alone, before falling into the hands of the shogunal officials, threw himself into the sea together with the priest Gesshō, died and revived, and was exiled to the southern islands, where he preserved his life.Original
He also writes that, had Saigō continued wandering between Kyoto and Osaka, he was fully qualified to become a victim of Ii’s agents.OriginalOriginal

There are those who regret that the court could not save the shishi.Original
What kind of tyranny would Manabe wield once he entered Kyoto?Original
The court worried about this, and it is said that his actions turned out to be rather milder than expected.OriginalOriginal

In the early part of Ansei 6 (1859), Ii’s position was “unrivaled under heaven.”Original
Whether punishments were made lenient or severe depended entirely on Ii’s judgment alone.Original
Leniency would not have damaged his authority, nor would severity have increased it.Original
If a policy of compromise were to be carried out, this was the most favorable time for it.Original
Had he offered even one hand, let alone both, there would have been no one who refused to shake it.Original
But Ii, “riding the momentum of a tiger he could not dismount,” persisted in a policy of no compromise—this Sohō laments.OriginalOriginal

Original text (Japanese)Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 42: The Ansei Purge, part 3, NDL image 22

されば安政六年の初期に於ては、井伊の位地は、天下無敵であつた

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One Man in the West

The fifth day of the seventh month of Ansei 5 (1858).Original
Tokugawa Yoshikumi, domain lord of Nagoya, and Matsudaira Yoshinaga, domain lord of Fukui, were ordered into retirement and confinement; Tokugawa Nariaki was ordered into confinement; and Tokugawa Yoshiatsu and Tokugawa Yoshinobu of Mito were ordered to refrain from attending the castle.Original
This made the power of the Ii side blaze forth brilliantly across the realm, Sohō writes.Original
Though the victims were resentful, not one of them attempted to resist.Original
All of them “held their breath and lay low.”Original
That is, they held their breath in silence.
From this point the realm became one of “long live Ii.”OriginalOriginal

Yet at this time, in the west, there was one man: Shimazu Nariakira.Original
He was the domain lord of Satsuma, father-in-law of the shogun Tokugawa Iesada, and the great lord of Satsuma whom the shogunate had held in awe for over two hundred years.Original
He never held his breath or lay low.Original
In his eyes there was no room for the likes of Ii Kamon no kami; on one side there was no Nariaki, on the other no Ii, and it was only natural that he should treat Matsudaira Yoshinaga and Tokugawa Yoshikumi as mere children—that is, treat them as children, Sohō records.Original
The court placed its trust in him through the Konoe house, and he too resolved with deep feeling to answer that trust.Original
But at the very instant he was about to raise his foot to act, he fell ill and died.OriginalOriginal

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Had he risen, Chōshū too would surely have been stirred into some kind of action.Original
But once Nariakira had departed, there was not a single daimyo who rose of his own accord to uphold the imperial will and stand against Ii.Original
Nor was there among the officials of the various domains anyone of such resolve.Original
Rather, they were “so pressed that the days were not enough,” busying themselves with restraining the reckless among their own domain retainers so as not to draw Ii’s glare.OriginalOriginal

Satsuma exiled Saigō to a remote island.Original
Chōshū imprisoned Shōin and in due course sent him under guard to Edo.Original
Even if those in charge at Chōshū had no black-hearted scheme to place him in a position of death, they must surely have resolved that sacrificing him was unavoidable for the safety of the domain as a whole, Sohō surmises.Original
This was not true of Chōshū alone.Original
Echizen offered up “Hashimoto Sanai, the great wall of the domain” as a sacrifice to the shogunate officials, unable to lift even a single finger.Original
In Mito, officials such as Ajima and Chigane were wholly absorbed in trying to restrain the rash and reckless actions of men like Kaneko and Takahashi.Original
Ajima and Chigane themselves in time became victims of Ii as well.OriginalOriginal

Piping Till the Breath Ran Out

Ii had, in form, almost completely subdued Kyoto as well.Original
Neither court nobles nor warrior houses dared to raise a hand against Ii.Original
The movement in Kyoto to secure the bestowal of an imperial edict was one incident that arose in the midst of all this.Original
Men of resolve expected that once the imperial edict came down, not only Mito but all the domains with men of resolve would “rejoice and dance for joy” and rush to its cause.Original
That is, they anticipated that people would rush forward in joyful dance.Original
But this was “a reliance placed on what could not be relied upon.”Original
Even Mito, the very domain on which it most depended, did not respond—or rather, could not respond.Original
As for the rest, it may be inferred accordingly.Original
“Is this the fault of the men of resolve who were betrayed, or the responsibility of the domains that betrayed them?”Original
In either case, “the men of resolve piped until their breath ran out, but not a single domain danced.”Original
The Ansei Purge had nothing to do with whether or not the imperial edict existed.Original
Even had the edict never come down, this purge was bound to occur.Original
The arrest of shishi among the common people was a plot long since devised between Nagano Shuzen and Utsugi Rokunojō, the two right and left hands of Ii.Original
Given that Hashimoto Sanai and Yoshida Torajirō, who had no connection whatsoever to the matter of the imperial edict, were sentenced to death, it should be clear that the edict affair was not the sole cause of the great purge, it is said.Original
Sheep stood lined up before the wolf.Original
The shepherds who should have protected the sheep, fearing Ii’s glare, handed over the sheep themselves.Original
Sohō’s pen, while placing the root of the calamity in Ii’s original resolve to pick a fight, seems also to turn its gaze toward the silence of the domains that allowed that fight to take shape.Original
To the ears of the men of resolve who piped until their breath ran out, no sound of dancing feet was ever heard.OriginalOriginal

Original text (Japanese)Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 42: The Ansei Purge, part 3, NDL image 24

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Sources and verificationHow to read the marks / AI policy
Source textKinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 42: The Ansei Purge, part 3 (1940). National Diet Library Digital Collections (PDM). PID 1228565
Checked againstIshin shiryō kōyō, vol. 1 (1937). PID 1046665
Dates and namesAll 1 dates in the text exist in the calendar for their year, and the Western years given alongside them agree. Of the 14 people named in the text, 11 also appear in Ishin shiryō kōyō, vol. 1.
English gates111 of 111 sentences passed the checks on the English text.

This article is a reading of Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 42: The Ansei Purge, part 3. Tokutomi Sohō’s views are those of the 1920s and 1930s and may differ from current scholarship. The source text is a century old and may differ from current scholarship.

PeopleShimazu NariakiraTokugawa IesadaTokugawa YoshinobuTokugawa YoshikumiTokugawa YoshiatsuTokugawa NariakiMatsudaira YoshinagaHashimoto SanaiManabe AkikatsuAbe MasahiroYear1853Kaei