It cannot be compared to the time when Shimazu Nariakira was alive, Tokutomi Sohō notes about Satsuma at the time. From the 2nd month to the 12th month of Ansei 5 (1858), in Kyoto, Manabe repeatedly made proposals to the court concerning the agreements with foreign countries. Letters rejoicing over the outcome in Kyoto had reached great elder Ii.
What regent Kujō proposed was a plan to first try trade for about 5 years, arranging matters so the other side gained no profit, and thereby naturally driving them away. The guarantee was to be that shogun Tokugawa Iemochi would himself affix his seal. When Manabe replied that this presented difficulties, the term was extended to 7 years, and the guarantors changed to the shogun’s guardian Tayasu Yoshiyori and great elder Ii, among others. Shoshidai Sakai Tadaaki was refused an audience by the regent, offered an apology through the public steward Miura Yoshinobu, and shodaibu of the Kujō house Shimada Ryūshō mediated. Tokutomi Sohō writes that he was astonished at this time-limited plan, wondering whether it was not deceiving the emperor.
On the 9th day of the 11th month, the emperor wrote that insisting on the view of setting a term and then withdrawing would become a great trouble. If even a single day were permitted, it would amount to having consented. He also wrote that this would go against the purpose of the prayer he had sent an envoy to Ise in the 6th month to offer in his own hand, and that if the people lost hope, it would bear on the very survival of the shogunate. He also would not approve the plan to replace Kanagawa with Shimoda, and his view was that if it had to be permitted, the same strict controls as at Nagasaki should apply. On the same day, regent Kujō conveyed this content to the shoshidai in strict confidence.
On the same day, the emperor also wrote a letter to minister of the left Konoe Tadahiro. He stated that it was a serious matter that the regent had shown him, in strict confidence, the depositions of Kobayashi Yoshisuke and others who had been captured along with Ukai’s letters, and that the affair had spread even to its branches and leaves. Minister of the right Takatsukasa Sukehiro was hopeless, and now he himself stood alone with no one to consult, he said. He also wrote that Manabe’s measures were violent, asking whether word could not secretly be sent to Satsuma and elsewhere to remove the wrongdoers, and whether a message could not be passed through Konoe Tadafusa, who was going down to the east for the shogun’s investiture. In his letter of the 13th as well, he repeated that he could not help worrying when only young men were involved, and that he felt helpless standing alone.
Edo’s rejoicing had been for nothing, Tokutomi Sohō says. Utsugi’s reply to Nagano, dated the 19th day of the 11th month, conveys surprise that the situation had completely changed with the document that arrived on the 18th. Tokutomi Sohō views it that the emperor had thought this way from the start, and that Manabe and the others, by rashly believing in a good outcome, had betrayed him. Tokutomi Sohō’s judgment is that they had misjudged the emperor’s character.
Nijō was about to go down to Edo but was stopped on the evening of the 12th, and Ii accepted Nagano’s recommendation concerning how the matter should be handled in Edo. Attendant Ishikawa Tosa no kami committed ritual suicide, Date Munenari requested retirement, and Yamauchi Toyoshige was also to be made to retire. While letters said the prisoners were being sent to Edo and that the footing remained unshaken, in the palace the emperor had twice written that he stood alone.
How Manabe’s proposal was rejected by the court can be followed through the emperor’s letters of the 9th and 13th day of the 11th month, the directive from regent Kujō to the shoshidai, the reply from Utsugi to Nagano, and Tokutomi Sohō’s judgment.
In other words, it was a letter happily reporting the outcome in Kyoto.Original
Ii read through it that very morning.OriginalOriginal
Hearing that things were nine-tenths favorable, he was all the more gratified—so the meaning goes.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryBut Tokutomi Sohō also turns his attention to the passage just before this letter.Original
He would not be allowed to return until matters in Kyoto were settled.Original
Tokutomi Sohō reads this as meaning that Ii, while satisfied with the good news, still harbored no small “concern” about what lay ahead.OriginalOriginal
Five Years, or Seven Years?
The center of his concern was Hyōgo.OriginalOriginal
Various complications arose.
Tokutomi Sohō summarizes the proposal put forward by Regent Kujō as follows.Original
First, trade would be tried for about five years, during which the other side would be maneuvered so as to gain no profit, and would thus naturally withdraw.Original
The proposal was that the shogun Tokugawa Iemochi would guarantee this with his “own seal,” affixing it himself.Original
When Manabe replied that this presented difficulties, the regent extended the term from five years to seven, and changed the guarantor to Tayasu Yoshiyori, guardian of the shogun, or to great elder Ii and the other senior councillors.OriginalOriginal
The same letter also reports on the movements of shoshidai Sakai Tadaaki.Original
Sakai, startled at being “refused an audience” by Regent Kujō, offered an apology through his official steward Miura Yoshinobu.Original
Shimada Ryūshō, a shodaibu of the Kujō house, persuaded Miura, and Sakai too is said to have taken on the “appearance of having had a change of heart.”Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that unity among Kujō, Manabe, and Sakai was an indispensable requirement for the policy of the Ii faction.OriginalOriginal
But Tokutomi Sohō is astonished at the term proposal itself.Original
Could the idea of closing Hyōgo after five or seven years really be carried out?Original
“Is this not, if one may say so, a deception of the emperor’s sagacious wisdom?”Original
If one may say so, is this not deceiving the emperor, says Tokutomi Sohō.OriginalOriginal
兵庫開港に年限を付け、五年乃至七年の後には、それを閉鎖するなどと云ふ事が、果して實行せらる可き乎。
Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryTokutomi Sohō writes that this reveals the hidden intent of sending prisoners from Kyoto to Edo in order to terrify the “schemers”—the opposing faction as seen from the Ii side.Original
A postscript states that Mito “has given no word at this time.”OriginalOriginal
Not Even One Day, Half a Day
The ninth day of the eleventh month.OriginalOriginal
The proposals of the Edo envoy, that is Manabe, are various, but to “cling to them would be a great calamity.”Original
There is also talk of setting a time limit and then withdrawing, but once permission is granted, the disgrace to the nation cannot be undone.Original
“Even if it is only for a single day, if permission is granted, it will come to appear as consent.”Original
Even if permission is given for just one day, it will take on the appearance of consent, the emperor wrote.OriginalOriginal
It was not a matter of five years or seven years, says Tokutomi Sohō.Original
It also went against the intent of the prayer offered in the emperor’s own hand when an envoy bearing offerings was sent to Ise this past sixth month.Original
If the people of the realm lose hope, it “may come to affect the safety of the shogunate itself.”Original
This is a phrase meaning that it would also touch upon the safety of the shogunate.Original
Tokutomi Sohō interprets this passage as meaning that the matter was a question of life or death not only for the court but for the shogunate as well, and that if permission were granted carelessly, the whole realm might rise up as an enemy of the shogunate.Original
“Even if it is for one day or half a day, it cannot be consented to.”Original
Not even one day, nor half a day, could be consented to.Original
The imperial letter concludes that, as stated this past spring, nothing short of a return to the Shimoda treaty could be consented to.OriginalOriginal
The emperor also would not nod in agreement to the proposal of replacing Kanagawa with Shimoda.Original
What would happen if they gradually encroached into the vicinity of Edo?Original
He writes that it is not far from the shogun’s castle, and that in the event of some unforeseen incident it would be dangerous.Original
It was his wish that, if permission must unavoidably be granted, strict control should be exercised just as had been done at Nagasaki with China and Holland.Original
And he adds that, so that “the relationship between court and shogunate should not become severed,” those in the office of assistance should exercise wise judgment.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryRegent Kujō, on that same day, immediately issued an order to the shoshidai.Original
Manabe’s report had been conveyed to the throne, but the emperor’s wishes had not changed since this past spring.Original
“Setting aside five or six years, even if for one day the foreigners and the people of the nation grow familiar and a trading house is settled upon”—this would contradict the intent of the emperor’s own prayer written in his hand.Original
The meaning is: setting aside five or six years, even if for just one day foreigners and the people grow familiar and a trading house is decided upon, that would not do.Original
It was a confidential order stating that a copy of the imperial letter would be shown “in strictest secrecy,” and that it should be carefully understood and reconsidered with great care.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō writes that this imperial letter, even if not quite a bolt from the blue, must have given the regent and his associates a shock close to one.OriginalOriginal
Standing Alone, Privately
At the hour of the monkey on that same ninth day of the eleventh month, the emperor wrote yet another letter, this one to the minister of the left, Konoe Tadahiro, whom he closely trusted.Original
Tokutomi Sohō sees this letter as revealing the emperor’s state of mind even more clearly.OriginalOriginal
此れは前者に比すれば、寧ろ至尊の時局に對する御心事を、一層明瞭ならしむるものがある。
Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryBut the emperor writes that “the branches and leaves have flourished thickly”—the fact that the matter had spread even to its branches and leaves was a “great calamity.”Original
Tokutomi Sohō calls particular attention to these four characters.OriginalOriginal
What were these branches and leaves?Original
Several volumes of “statements of testimony,” the depositions of Kobayashi Yoshisuke and others who had been arrested, which the regent had brought with him.Original
A letter of Ukai’s, said to have been seized from a courier.Original
These were things the regent had shown to the emperor “in the utmost secrecy.”Original
The emperor notes that, at a glance, there were things whose truth or error could not be determined, but that quite a number of matters were written that would “become a harm to that side.”Original
The minister of the right, Takatsukasa Sukehiro, was “beyond hope,” but he wished to draw out the minister of the left, Konoe, alone.Original
But Sakai too says that for Konoe to appear at court now would, on the contrary, be bad for him.OriginalOriginal
Then this phrase follows.Original
It means that he now stood alone, with no one to consult, so forlorn that he felt almost dizzy.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes only, “Indeed, there are no words to describe it.”OriginalOriginal
The imperial letter continues further.Original
Manabe’s measures were “a reckless scheme,” a violent plot.Original
“Could it not be arranged, through Satsuma or some such, secretly and without fail, to destroy the treacherous villains?”Original
Could he not secretly arrange matters with Satsuma or some other domain, without fail, so as to destroy the treacherous villains?Original
Since Konoe Tadafusa was fortunately traveling east for the shogunal investiture, could a message not be conveyed in the strictest secrecy to a related daimyo?OriginalOriginal
At that time vulgar opinion prevailed in Satsuma, and it was nothing like the days when Shimazu Nariakira had been alive.Original
But whose conduct had driven the emperor to let slip the words “destroy the treacherous villains”?OriginalOriginal
At the half-hour of the Hour of the Dragon on the thirteenth day of the eleventh month, the Emperor again wrote to Konoe.Original
With Konoe, Takatsukasa, and Sanjō, the three lords, all in seclusion together, “if things are left to the younger men, it is truly, truly worrying.”Original
If only young men were left in charge, he could not help but worry.Original
“At present I stand utterly alone, truly forlorn and in great distress.”OriginalOriginal
Premature Rejoicing
Edo’s joy was “premature rejoicing,” Tokutomi Sohō says.Original
A reply letter dated the nineteenth day of the eleventh month from Utsugi to Nagano conveys that gap.OriginalOriginal
Utsugi read it with joy, writing “indeed, how grateful I am.”Original
However, when a document dated the twelfth arrived on the eighteenth, “once again the situation changed completely,” turning around once more, saying that nothing beyond the Shimoda treaty could be permitted.Original
“Indeed, what an unexpected turn of events,” Utsugi writes, something quite unforeseen.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryTokutomi Sohō states firmly that this was by no means a mere change of mood.Original
The Emperor had held that intention from the very start.Original
Because nothing particular had happened when Manabe went to the court, Manabe and the others had too readily believed a favorable outcome, and in effect had betrayed themselves, Tokutomi Sohō suggests.OriginalOriginal
Utsugi’s letter continues in a view resembling sour grapes.Original
Shimada Ryūshō, undeterred by his illness, was exerting himself day and night, and Ii too praised his loyal service.Original
As for Sakai, there was “half belief, half doubt” as to whether he was outwardly following the court nobles while actually pursuing the shogunate’s aims.Original
Manabe, it was said, had “resolved to see out the year,” meaning he was determined to remain in Kyoto even past the New Year.OriginalOriginal
“They had completely misjudged the character of Emperor Kōmei.”Original
They had misunderstood, thinking that if only the opposition faction in Kyoto were swept away, His Majesty could be managed however they wished.Original
The trouble was, with all due reverence, that the Emperor himself was the very substance of the matter.Original
“Though the subjects moved according to the sovereign, the sovereign did not readily move according to the subjects,” Tokutomi Sohō writes.OriginalOriginal
Before the Gate of Myōmanji
Circular letters to the outer lords, and arrangements requesting an emergency force at the Osaka warehouse residence.Original
On the ninth, the following day, when Naitō went to Myōmanji, Manabe’s lodging, and made representations, Manabe replied.Original
He said he could not reply to someone holding no office, but would reply if the matter were conveyed through the regent or the two court liaisons, Hirohashi and Madenokōji.Original
Naitō, “in a rage,” took this back, Nijō went to the court, and on the evening of the twelfth his departure was suddenly halted.Original
Nijō is said to have reported that if he went down to Edo and spoke directly with the great elder and the senior councilors, he could do something about the content of the treaty even if not all of it, and that he and the great elder had long understood each other.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryNagano offered advice on how Nijō should be handled if he went down to the east.Original
He should be kept in Edo while negotiations were conducted with Kyoto.Original
If he came down carrying an imperial letter, he should be treated with even greater caution.Original
There were also “troubling rumors” concerning Nijō, such as his request for a force at the Osaka warehouse residence, and it would be best to tell Kyoto that it was suspicious for so important an imperial command to be entrusted to such a person.Original
Ii found this opinion “entirely reasonable” and accepted it as such, Utsugi writes.Original
He discussed it closely with the senior councilors as well, and depending on how Nijō made his case, he would take “whatever measures the occasion required.”OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō reads here something left unsaid.Original
Just as one wave was about to subside, another wave rose.Original
The Ii faction had at last resolved upon its final course, settling on “a means of intimidating the court by force,” a strategy of threatening the court with power, Tokutomi Sohō says.OriginalOriginal
Rumors of an Attack, and a Death Poem
Letters from around the same time also mixed in rumors from Edo.Original
There was a rumor that “someone had cut in, and as usual retainers had been injured.”Original
It was a story that someone had attacked, leaving injured men among the Hikone retainers.Original
Utsugi denied it, saying it was a baseless fabrication by the opposing faction.Original
Tokutomi Sohō notes that this rumor would later become “truth born from a lie,” as would become painfully clear through the Sakurada affair.OriginalOriginal
Mito remained “silent,” though gifts came quietly from time to time.Original
The Ii faction read this as a sign that Mito was unsettled.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that although some watched Ii’s moods carefully, there were also not a few companions determined not to rest until they had taken Ii’s head, and that Ii’s side, looking only one way, failed to see the other, calling this “utterly laughable.”OriginalOriginal
Ishikawa Tosa no kami, an attendant, committed seppuku.Original
Utsugi writes that it was “regrettable” that no firm evidence could be obtained, and matters had come to the point of forcing him to take his own life.Original
Tokutomi Sohō reads this as meaning that, had there been evidence, they had intended to arrest Ishikawa as well and add another page to the great purge.Original
According to the Ansei Kiji, Ishikawa was fifty-nine years old.Original
He did not regret giving his life for his lord, but what was he to do about a disgrace he had never deserved?OriginalOriginal
Date Munenari requested to retire, and it is said that Yamauchi Toyoshige would also be made to retire.Original
There would no longer be any lords siding with the opposing faction, Utsugi wrote.OriginalOriginal
The prisoner was heading to Edo, the lords were withdrawing, and the letter says Edo’s footing was as solid as rock.Original
In that same month, within the palace, an emperor had written, “I stand alone.”Original
Twice, the same words.Original
Solid as rock, and standing alone — which was truly unmoving?OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet Library| Source text | Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 41: The Ansei Purge, part 2 (1940). National Diet Library Digital Collections (PDM). PID 1228553 |
| Checked against | Ishin shiryō kōyō, vol. 2. PID 1046669 |
| Dates and names | The text has 5 dates, but they have not been checked against the calendar. None of them gives a Japanese era year in the text, so there is no year to check them against. Of the 9 people named in the text, 6 also appear in Ishin shiryō kōyō, vol. 2. |
| English gates | 126 of 126 sentences passed the checks on the English text. |
This article is a reading of Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 41: The Ansei Purge, part 2. Tokutomi Sohō’s views are those of the 1920s and 1930s and may differ from current scholarship. The source text is a century old and may differ from current scholarship.
