Kobayashi Yoshisuke, who served the Takatsukasa family, was one of those arrested in the 9th month of Ansei 5 (1858). That same month, the shoshidai (the shogunate office that watched over the court in Kyoto), Sakai Tadaaki, was writing a document to be circulated among the court nobles. He was the man pushed to the front of the crackdown on those trying to press their views on the court, acting under a special order from the great elder Ii Naosuke.
On the 25th day of the 9th month of Ansei 5 (1858), a retainer who handled Sakai’s affairs delivered the document to the residence of the former Minister of the Interior, Sanjō Sanetsumu. Tokutomi Sohō calls this a letter of warning, and judges that Sakai also had some points deserving sympathy. “Conscience makes a man cowardly” is Tokutomi Sohō’s verdict on Sakai. The document first states that the emperor’s order this spring was reasonable, and that it brought tears. It placed responsibility for signing the treaty on two senior councilors who had been swayed by foreign arguments.
Tokutomi Sohō judges it unreasonable to place even the great elder and the senior councilors outside the blame. The document goes on to write that Confucian scholars, physicians, and masterless samurai were confusing the hearts of the people and aiding the foreigners. It also argued that since internal strife was exactly what the foreigners wanted, the court nobles should quickly and quietly return to order. The crucial point was one clause: that if there were no change of heart, matters would unavoidably be left to the disposal of the Kantō. Tokutomi Sohō reads this as a roundabout threat.
In an undated second letter, it was conveyed that since someone in Edo had confessed, those implicated should be handed over. On one hand people were being arrested; on the other, words of threat were being sent. Sakai went to the Imperial Palace on the 2nd day of the 10th month of Ansei 5 (1858); the hikurōdo diary records that he had an audience around 3 o’clock in the afternoon and was granted a cup of sake. In the record of Konoe Tadahiro’s dictated statement from the same day, there appear both a lament that it would be a great harm to the country if things went according to the treaty, and words saying that the matter of his resignation as regent would be as the shogunate wished.
Tokutomi Sohō sees it that the signed treaty could not be rescinded, and that if the shogunate acted entirely according to the court’s wishes, it would find itself with nowhere to turn. Tokutomi Sohō’s reading is that the shogunate obtained Kujō’s reinstatement through a verbal promise alone, and that this was the first step in the court’s side giving way. The court nobles had no means left, and with the arrest of Kobayashi Yoshisuke, discussions of appointing someone to deal with Manabe Akikatsu also came to a halt. Meanwhile, Nagano Yoshikoto and Shimada Sakon were pressing Sakai. Nagano’s argument was that, as long as Ii remained in office as great elder, any treason by the Ii family was treason against the shogunate itself, and that the Kantō should investigate it thoroughly.
Nagano submitted an almost identical written opinion to his lord Ii as well, but states that the closing phrase gave the other side grounds for excuse. In Utsugi’s reply letter dated the 6th day of the 10th month of Ansei 5 (1858), there was recorded Sakai’s message that if the Takatsukasa father and child were sent to a distant island, the other court nobles would fall silent. It is said that Manabe too was outwardly firm but inwardly discouraged, and had said that another port would do in place of Hyōgo. Tokutomi Sohō records that, amid the fear that gripped the whole court as arrests followed one after another, there was no room to bring up terms of exchange. In the eyes of Nagano and the others, even Manabe, who had been sent in, appeared weak-kneed—and there the chapter closes.
The course by which Sakai Tadaaki set out threat and explanation side by side on a single sheet of paper can be traced through the document delivered to Sanjō Sanetsumu’s residence, the record of Konoe Tadahiro’s dictated statement, the hikurōdo diary, Nagano Yoshikoto’s written opinion, and Utsugi’s reply letter.
The twenty-fifth day of the ninth month of Ansei 5 (1858), Kyoto.Original
Miura Yoshinobu (Shichibei), the official steward of the shoshidai Sakai Tadaaki, brought a document to the residence of the former Inner Minister Sanjō Sanetsumu.Original
It came with a request that it be circulated among the court nobles.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryIt was the first coherent statement written by the shoshidai, who had entered Kyoto on the third day of the ninth month but had not yet gone to court, addressed to the court nobles of the imperial court.Original
Tokutomi Sohō calls this the “warning letter.”OriginalOriginal
“Conscience makes men cowardly.”
Tokutomi Sohō writes that Sakai Tadaaki’s position was “somewhat deserving of sympathy.”Original
He was “fully aware” of every aspect, inside and out, of Kyoto.Original
On top of that, bearing the special orders of the great elder Ii Naosuke, he had been pushed to the front line of suppressing the Righteous Faction.Original
He is said to have been someone who “understood somewhat more” than an ordinary daimyo the great cause of reverence for the emperor.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō sees this as not merely due to an indecisive nature.Original
“Conscience makes men cowardly.”Original
With that single phrase, Tokutomi Sohō assesses Sakai.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryManabe had entered Kyoto on the seventeenth day of the ninth month.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that it was “circumstances beyond his control” that forced Sakai’s hand to move in that direction, even if not entirely as Nagano and Shimada had ordered.OriginalOriginal
“A great affliction of the divine land, an aid to the foreign barbarians.”
At the opening of the warning letter, Sakai touches on the imperial edict issued at the time of Hotta Masayoshi’s journey to Kyoto that spring, writing, “The purport of the imperial will is truly most reasonable in every respect, and I have indeed been moved to tears.”Original
He says that the imperial will was truly reasonable, and that he was moved to tears.Original
Then, regarding the signing of the treaty, he states that among the senior councilors there were “those led astray by the wicked theories of the Western barbarians,” and that two senior officials had abruptly been ordered to retire.OriginalOriginal
He declares this an attempt to place the responsibility for the signing solely on the two senior councilors Hotta Masayoshi and Matsudaira Tadakata, and that if the minds of the great elder and senior councilors at the time were truly like this, it was “truly base.”Original
He also writes that while he himself had held no post at the time, it was “surely not a reasonable matter to apply” in excluding the great elder and senior councilors from responsibility.OriginalOriginal
The point of the warning letter next turns toward the shishi among the populace.Original
“Confucian scholars, physicians, and vagrants, taking advantage of the void and misleading the masses with cunning wit”—many used the spring imperial edict as a pretext to pursue their own gain.Original
Such people, it says, are “a great affliction of the divine land, an aid to the foreign barbarians.”Original
The meaning is that Confucian scholars, physicians, and masterless samurai confuse the hearts of the people, and that this is the same as helping the foreign countries that are watching Japan.Original
Tokutomi Sohō remarks, “What a clever phrase he managed to produce,” and reads this as a stratagem meant to cut off at the root the fact that the court was being moved by activists among the populace.OriginalOriginal
以上は當時の有志者を、攻擊したる文句にしては能くも巧妙なる文句を點出したるものだ。彼等の意見が朝廷の議となりて出で來りつゝあつた根本其の遮防策を施さんとしたものであらう
Open the original page at the National Diet LibrarySakai further argues that foreign countries conquer small states by force, grow close to large states through trade, and if civil strife breaks out, side with one party to carve up territory—”truly, civil strife is what the foreign barbarians desire.”Original
That is to say, civil strife is precisely what foreign countries desire.Original
Therefore, he asks that the three ministers and nine high court nobles “cast away suspicion” and exert sincere effort to return to tranquility as soon as possible.OriginalOriginal
And then the crucial phrase.Original
Whatever word might come from Edo, he wishes that the court nobles be spared even a single word of interrogation, but says that “if there is no occasion for a change of heart,” it would, unavoidably, be left to the disposition of the Kantō.Original
Tokutomi Sohō notes that this “secretly uses words of intimidation to urge repentance and correction.”OriginalOriginal
A second, undated letter was then also issued.Original
Its content was that, since several people had been arrested in Edo and had gradually confessed, a request had come to name and hand down those implicated—truly an unavoidable matter.Original
Tokutomi Sohō surmises that this was around the time Kobayashi Yoshisuke of the Takatsukasa house and other court nobles connected to the affair were sent to Edo.Original
On one hand, those involved were arrested and imprisoned; on the other, such words of intimidation were issued.Original
“Who could fail to be moved in his heart by this?”OriginalOriginal
It is a lament that this can be perceived as a scheme to drive a wedge between the sovereign and Konoe, a troubling matter.Original
Tokutomi Sohō notes that one can see the hands of Sakai and Naitō beginning to move even close to the sovereign’s side.OriginalOriginal
The Second Day of the Tenth Month: The Imperial Cup at the Kogosho
Sakai, who had entered Kyoto on the third day of the ninth month, did not go to court until a month later, on the second day of the tenth month.Original
According to the hikurōdo diary, at the half-hour of the Sheep, around three in the afternoon, there was an imperial appearance at the Kogosho, and after an audience, an imperial cup was bestowed.Original
Tokutomi Sohō reads this visit to court as something carried out only after confirming that the effect of the warning letter had nearly appeared.OriginalOriginal
On the same day, there is a draft record of an oral statement from Konoe Tadahiro to Sakai.Original
It begins by saying that when Sakai’s utmost sincerity regarding the barbarian affair was reported to the throne, there was imperial appreciation, and continues that, should matters proceed as in the treaty, it would be “a great harm to the divine country,” which is deeply lamented and regarded with concern, and that the shogunate’s officials should exert effort to uphold the imperial intent.Original
And: “Regarding the matter of the regent’s resignation as well, it shall be declared in accordance with the purport of the reply to the imperial private intention.”Original
Tokutomi Sohō notes that this means it was in accordance with the shogunate’s request, which had wished for his continuation in office as the dying wish of the former shogun Tokugawa Iesada.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryTokutomi Sohō sees here the predicament of the shogunate.Original
However much it was the imperial will, the signed treaty could not be rescinded.Original
The court’s wishes appeared peaceable, yet if obeyed to the letter, the shogunate would fall into mortal danger.OriginalOriginal
Moreover, to pledge reverent compliance was an abstract promise for the future, while the regent’s reinstatement was a concrete fact in the present.Original
If one merely says it will be done in words, that is all it amounts to, and as “the price of this dubious reply,” the court would end up reinstating Kujō, whom it had taken such trouble to have resign.Original
Tokutomi Sohō sees this oral statement as the first step of the Righteous Faction bowing down to the Ii faction, or at least its beginning.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō also does not forget that the Righteous Faction was entirely unarmed.Original
Two days after Manabe entered Kyoto, the father and son Ukai of Mito were bound, and on the twenty-second, Kobayashi Yoshisuke was bound as well.Original
Konoe, Takatsukasa Sukehiro, Sanjō, and others had been discussing putting forward Kobayashi and Kasuga Nakasato of the Koga house to deal with Manabe, but with Kobayashi’s arrest, this plan came to a halt.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes, “However valiant the court’s righteous faction may be, they are entirely bare-handed.”OriginalOriginal
“Rebellion by the head of the house is rebellion against the shogunate.”
While Sakai was pressing the Righteous Faction, Nagano and Shimada, conversely, were pressing Sakai.OriginalOriginal
Since Manabe’s entry into Kyoto, the father and son Ukai, Kobayashi, Senior Assistant Minister of Popular Affairs, and Kaneda Iori of the same house had been arrested, and “among the court nobles both high and low, a considerable look of fear could be seen.”Original
It is said that both court nobles and retainers showed considerable signs of fear.Original
Tokutomi Sohō describes this as having “imposed a rule of terror” on Kyoto.OriginalOriginal
Nagano’s argument was focused on a single point.Original
On this basis, he held that the allegation of “rebellion in the Kantō,” that Ii and Kujō had secretly colluded, was the very origin of the affair, and that if this point were made clear, both the restoration of the regent and the exposure of the conspiracy would follow naturally.OriginalOriginal
Yet Sakai concerned himself only with “trivial branches and twigs.”Original
Nagano objected.Original
“While in office, rebellion by one’s own house is rebellion against the shogunate itself.”Original
As long as Ii held the office of great elder, any rebellion by the Ii house was rebellion against the shogunate, and it ought to be thoroughly investigated from the Kantō side; the witnesses to this were himself and Shimada Sakon, he said.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryOn the same date, Nagano submitted a memorandum in almost identical wording to his own lord, Ii Naosuke.Original
Though there were threatening words, the underlying weakness had been seen through, and moreover the closing phrase, “if matters proceed as the Kantō intends, it will above all not serve the court’s own interest,” had become grounds for excuse-making by retired regent Takatsukasa Masamichi, Konoe, Takatsukasa Sukehiro, and others.OriginalOriginal
Nagano further urged that once Manabe’s business was concluded, measures should be devised to inform Kujō, as the wish expressed during the lifetime of the former shogun Iesada, of the “disorder in the court’s governance.”Original
“He plotted a thorough cleansing of the court. He was a man who would not rest until the deed was accomplished,” Tokutomi writes.Original
Nagano also attached something called “Kobayashi’s statement.”Original
Tokutomi states that while he “cannot say for certain” whether this truly came from the mouth of Kobayashi Yoshisuke, or how far the trial records of the time can be trusted, it is nevertheless clear that Nagano used this as evidence to urge Ii toward a policy of sweeping arrests.OriginalOriginal
The sixth day of the tenth month: Utsugi’s reply
The response to Nagano’s memorandum appears in Utsugi’s reply dated the sixth day of the tenth month.OriginalOriginal
On the matter of Konoe’s secret order that an imperial rescript would be issued if action were taken against the Ii house, Tokutomi himself hesitates.Original
Konoe Tadahiro was “a gentle and seasoned elder, not the sort one would expect to utter such violent words”; there must have been some circumstance in between, he says.Original
It was not Ii’s military authority but the power of the position of great elder itself, he argues.OriginalOriginal
The reply contains an unexpected passage.Original
It states that Sakai had sent word that if the Takatsukasa father and son were exiled to a remote island, the other court nobles would stop speaking out, and Konoe’s resignation from the post of regent’s deputy and Kujō’s reinstatement would be accomplished.Original
This was a hardline measure that not even Nagano or Shimada had voiced.Original
In Utsugi’s interpretation, Sakai, anticipating that the Kantō would never adopt such a proposal, had deliberately put on a show of toughness.Original
Tokutomi, while unable to vouch for either interpretation, writes that it is “more than easy to surmise” that this was a desperate proposal made under pressure, after being blamed by Nagano and others for indecision.OriginalOriginal
There is one more point.
Manabe Akikatsu too, it is said, sent word that “though he appears outwardly firm, in his inner mind his resolve seems to have broken,” and that if the opening of Hyōgo were replaced with another port, everything would go smoothly.Original
That is, outwardly he appeared strong, but inwardly he seemed to have lost heart.Original
Kyoto at first tried to make this a bargaining condition, but amid the whole court being seized with fear over Manabe’s entry into the capital and the arrest of the shishi, “crushing the proclamation of the shogun’s succession was something that could almost never have come even in a dream,” Tokutomi records.OriginalOriginal
京都でも最初は、之を一種の交換條件として幕府に臨まんと然も間部上京、志士就縛等にて、將軍宣下の握り潰しなど、殆んど夢にも出で來り得可きものでは
Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryBetween two pressures
Seen in this way, in Kyoto in the ninth month of Ansei 5 (1858), two pressures were advancing at once.Original
In the eyes of Nagano and others, not only was Sakai’s weak-kneedness obvious, but even Manabe Akikatsu, the “commander of the punitive force,” seemed liable at any moment to expose his own cowardly weakness—so Tokutomi closes the chapter.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryIn Sakai’s warning letter, threats, excuses, and tearful gratitude toward the imperial will all appear side by side on the same page.Original
It was Tokutomi who read this wavering as “conscience.”Original
Nagano read it as “a weak and faint heart.”Original
Which reading came closer to the real Sakai—perhaps there need not be only one answer.Original
On the second day of the tenth month, the shoshidai received an imperial cup at the Kogosho.Original
In that same month, the retainers of court nobles were being sent off to Edo.Original
Did not Sakai Tadaaki hold, in one and the same person, both the hand that raised the cup and the hand that bound the rope?Original
| Source text | Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 41: The Ansei Purge, part 2 (1940). National Diet Library Digital Collections (PDM). PID 1228553 |
| Checked against | Ishin shiryō kōyō, vol. 3. PID 1041909 |
| Dates and names | All 8 dates in the text exist in the calendar for their year, and the Western years given alongside them agree. Of the 10 people named in the text, 9 also appear in Ishin shiryō kōyō, vol. 3. |
| English gates | 98 of 98 sentences passed the checks on the English text. |
This article is a reading of Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 41: The Ansei Purge, part 2. Tokutomi Sohō’s views are those of the 1920s and 1930s and may differ from current scholarship. The source text is a century old and may differ from current scholarship.
