In the 4th month of Ansei 1 (1854), the shogunate’s senior councilor in chief, Abe Masahiro, tried to resign his post. On the 10th day, he did not go to the castle. To Makino Tadamasa, a fellow senior councilor who also served as the officer in charge of coastal defense, he sent a notice saying he could not attend because his head ached and his vision was spinning. Folded inside that paper was a letter of request asking to be relieved of his post as senior councilor.
The letter of request was dated the 26th day of the 2nd month. He himself wrote of the circumstances: he had intended to submit it once the American ship left Shimoda, but the ship remained quiet and the days simply passed. The contents begin with thanks for having been given heavy duties and receiving rewards many times, and continue into an apology for having caused worry over the foreign ships. Since around the time a Dutch envoy’s ship came to Nagasaki in Kōka 1, foreign ships had been visible. He states that the blame for having failed to prepare the coastal defenses properly lies with himself as the foremost of the senior councilors. He requested to return the 10,000 koku that had been added to his stipend in Kaei 5. He added that he would be grateful if, after being relieved of his post, he were ordered to take up coastal defense duties instead.
Tokutomi Sohō writes that it requires scrutiny whether this truly came from a sense of responsibility taken at face value. According to the Ansei Kiji, the senior councilors Matsudaira Noriyasu and Matsudaira Tadakata and others strongly disliked Tokugawa Nariaki. Through the efforts of Naitō Suruga no kami, they joined with the daimyo stationed at Edo Castle, and Ii Naosuke and others are said to have responded. The document addressed to the shogun was handed to Abe Masahiro by his close attendant Hongō Tango no kami, who deliberately pretended to make a mistake, and it was simply suppressed as it was. The record of Fujita Tōko’s remarks is even more blunt. It says that Ii Naosuke was discussing pushing aside Tokugawa Nariaki and Abe Masahiro to take the seat of great elder himself, and installing Matsudaira Naritami in the aftermath.
That same Matsudaira Noriyasu was one of those who worked to make him reverse his intention to resign. The shortfall in preparations had been decided jointly by all the senior councilors, so it was not the fault of one man alone — he should come out again tomorrow at the latest. That such persuasion took place is recorded in the Kaikyū kiji, in a note left by Saitō Teibei. Shogun Tokugawa Iesada too was alarmed, and said that there was no need to take the blame because of the times, and that it would trouble him greatly if Abe resigned now. They even brought up the past example of Tokugawa Ieyoshi sending a junior councilor as messenger to make someone come to work.
On this very day, urgent word arrived that the Imperial Palace in Kyoto had burned down on the 6th. The senior councilors all together urged him to attend, Tokugawa Nariaki too strongly pressed him to stay on, and Makino Tadamasa likewise remained shut in at home, waiting. On the previous day, the 9th, a proclamation had already been issued acknowledging that, because preparations were not complete, the matter had been settled quietly. On that same day, an order was also handed down to Ii Naosuke to strengthen the defense of Kyoto. At the end of the 10 days, Abe Masahiro was ordered to take overall responsibility for the rebuilding of the Imperial Palace, and he wept.
The course of these 10 days surrounding the letter of resignation can be followed through the Kaikyū kiji and the Ansei Kiji, and through the assessment Tokutomi Sohō sets out in Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi.
Abe Masahiro’s Notice of Resignation
The tenth day of the fourth month of Ansei 1 (1854).Original
Abe Masahiro, the senior councilor in the chief seat, did not attend the castle.Original
He sent a short report to Makino Tadamasa, a fellow senior councilor who also served as a coastal defense officer.Original
It was a notice saying that his head ached and he felt dizzy, that it was a hardship, and that even if he tried to force himself out, he could not attend the castle.Original
He added that he was sorry to have withdrawn repeatedly at a time when there was much business to attend to.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryTucked into that report was another document.Original
A private petition.Original
It was a request to be relieved of his post as senior councilor.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that, having submitted this, Abe Masahiro decided to remain in seclusion and await his dismissal.OriginalOriginal
In the document, he explains the circumstances that had kept him from submitting it earlier.Original
He had intended to submit it promptly once the American ships withdrew from Shimoda.Original
But the ships remained entirely calm, and no incident seemed likely to occur.Original
Days simply passed, and there was no telling when they would withdraw.OriginalOriginal
The Document Dated the Twenty-sixth Day of the Second Month
The attached private petition bore the date of the twenty-sixth day of the second month.Original
He himself noted that he had submitted, just as it was, a document he had shown before.OriginalOriginal
The content begins first with a matter of favor.Original
He had been appointed to an unexpectedly heavy post, and despite having no particular merit in service, he had repeatedly received enormous rewards.Original
This, he said, was a fortune for which he was grateful.Original
On top of this, he apologized for having caused both lords unprecedented worry over the matter of the foreign ships.OriginalOriginal
正弘感泣して退きて曰く『不肖老中の首外國に對して國法在ぐるの責逃るべからず。然るに今其罪を問はれざるのみならず、て此大命を受く。豈に敢て努力して事に從はざるを得んや』と
Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryBut what follows is the main point.Original
The arrival of foreign ships was not something that had suddenly become known of late.Original
In Kōka 1, a Dutch envoy ship came to Nagasaki, and from around that time foreign ships gradually began to be seen.Original
Given this, military preparations should have been made and coastal defenses should have been thoroughly arranged.Original
This had not been done.
Even though the measures taken were only stopgaps, the laws of the realm had gradually crumbled, bringing disgrace upon the nation.Original
He took that responsibility upon himself.Original
“As I hold the chief seat among you all, this is entirely due to my own negligence.”Original
Since he stood at the head of the senior councilors, he said, everything was due to his own negligence.OriginalOriginal
If he remained in his post as he was, he would lose face before the lords, and even the shogunate’s measures would appear lax.Original
And so, he said that his heart could not rest easy if he kept receiving, unchanged, the ten thousand koku added to his stipend in Kaei 5, and he offered to return it as a small token of his sincerity.Original
He added one more word.
If, after being relieved of his post, he could be assigned coastal defense duties suited to his standing, he said, that would be truly welcome.OriginalOriginal
The Mood in the Tamarinoma
Did this private petition arise simply from the sense of responsibility stated in it?Original
Abe Masahiro was a politician, Tokutomi Sohō writes.Original
Some scrutiny, he says, is called for.Original
Tokutomi Sohō cites what the Ansei Kiji relates.Original
Around this time, the senior councilors Matsudaira Noriyasu and Matsudaira Tadakata and others had formed a faction and deeply detested Tokugawa Nariaki.Original
Naitō Suruga no kami worked busily to ally with the lords stationed in the Tamarinoma, and Ii Naosuke and others responded to this.Original
Holding that Tokugawa Nariaki’s attendance at the castle was not to the advantage of the state, he drafted, together with Tōdō Izumi no kami, a letter to the shogun.Original
That letter was entrusted to the attendant Hongō Tango no kami.Original
Hongō Tango no kami, feigning a mistake, handed it over to Abe Masahiro.Original
Abe Masahiro kept it after receiving it and did not pass it on.Original
The matter ended there.Original
This was the origin of Matsudaira Tadakata and Matsudaira Noriyasu’s alliance with Ii Naosuke, and this was also the beginning of Hongō Tango no kami’s being hated by Ii Naosuke, the Ansei Kiji continues.Original
Ii Naosuke was a child born of a concubine; he was adopted by his elder brother Naoaki, became heir apparent, and succeeded to the fief in the eleventh month of Kaei 3.Original
He held the hereditary post of Tamarinoma attendance.Original
His intention lay in currying favor with the senior councilors, excluding Mito, and obtaining the post of elder statesman.Original
At the same time, he was also scheming to restore the old practice, dating from his ancestors, of guarding Kyoto.Original
Fujita Tōko’s recorded remarks are more blunt.Original
Ii Naosuke was secretly plotting to remove Tokugawa Nariaki and Abe Masahiro, to take the seat of great elder himself, to set up Tōdō in support, and to install Matsudaira Naritami, the domain lord of Tsuyama, in the vacated post.Original
The mastermind of the plot was Naitō Suruga no kami.Original
Ii Naosuke was to draft a memorial for the shogun’s direct inspection, but Hongō Tango no kami, feigning ignorance, handed it to Abe Masahiro instead, and Abe, reading it without particular thought, disposed of it before it could reach the shogun’s ears.Original
There is surely no mistaking that some ill current was drifting about somewhere, Tokutomi Sohō says.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryA Messenger from a Relative
That same Matsudaira Noriyasu was one of those who moved to make Abe Masahiro reverse his intention to resign.Original
“The insufficiency of our preparedness is not a matter belonging to Ise no kami alone; it is something that resulted from deliberation by all of us together.”Original
He argued that the lack of adequate preparedness was not a matter concerning Abe Masahiro alone, that it was something the senior councilors had done together after deliberation, and that it could not be called the negligence of that one man alone.Original
And he wanted him to come to office as soon as tomorrow.Original
Saitō Teibei’s notes remain in the Kaikyū kiji.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryMatsudaira Noriyasu was a relative of Abe Masahiro.Original
It would seem he could hardly have been part of a faction working to oust Abe.Original
However, Matsudaira Noriyasu and Matsudaira Tadakata were both dismissed as senior councilors in the eighth month of Ansei 2 (1855).Original
In Ansei 2, Tokugawa Nariaki argued that these two men must certainly be dismissed.Original
There is also a story that the person to whom Ii Naosuke sent the most letters was Matsudaira Noriyasu.Original
Perhaps he should be counted among the conspirators seeking to oust Abe—so Tokutomi Sohō writes, leaving the matter open.OriginalOriginal
On the day he submitted his resignation, a retainer of Abe Masahiro went, at Matsudaira Noriyasu’s invitation, to his residence, and returned after receiving his private intentions.Original
At that time, Abe Masahiro is said to have responded with an extremely cold attitude.OriginalOriginal
“Because it would trouble me”
Tokutomi Sohō writes that the shogun Tokugawa Iesada was an extremely mediocre lord.Original
Even so, he knew that Abe Masahiro was the man most to be trusted.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryMatsudaira Noriyasu reported the matter of the resignation letter.Original
Tokugawa Iesada was astonished.Original
He asked what was meant by the “awe and self-restraint” mentioned in the letter, and whether there was some particular reason.Original
Matsudaira Noriyasu answered that it concerned the handling of foreign affairs.Original
Then Tokugawa Iesada said:Original
“That cannot be called the fault of Ise no kami alone”—it was not Abe Masahiro’s fault alone; the circumstances of the times had made it unavoidable, so there was no need for him to take the blame upon himself.Original
He continued, “because it would trouble me.”Original
If he resigned now it would cause him great trouble; they should explain this well among the senior councilors and arrange matters so that, however unwilling, Abe would press himself to come to office promptly.Original
It was even suggested that, if he still did not consent, a junior councilor might be sent as an envoy.Original
Formerly, when Mizuno Tadakuni was reappointed and Abe Masahiro had shut himself away, Tokugawa Ieyoshi had sent a junior councilor as an envoy to compel him to come to office.Original
There was a precedent.OriginalOriginal
The Imperial Palace Incident and the Request to Return to Office
On this very day, an urgent report arrived from the shoshidai (Kyoto deputy).Original
On the sixth day of that month, a fire had broken out at the imperial palace.Original
The Emperor had been moved to Shimo-Kamo.Original
Everyone was stunned.Original
This made resignation all the more difficult.Original
The following day, a fuller report arrived in turn.Original
The senior councilors, speaking with one voice, urged Abe to return to office.Original
At a time when there had been an incident at the palace and both high and low trembled with fear, this was no moment for a retainer to withdraw at his own will, they said.Original
Tokugawa Nariaki too earnestly urged him to stay.Original
Makino Tadamasa, saying that if Abe Masahiro remained shut away he himself could not remain as he was, likewise shut himself away.Original
Abe Masahiro’s reply was conveyed through the spoken message of Saitō Teibei.Original
The substance of the shogun’s will had penetrated to his very soul; he was awed and grateful.Original
He would come to office starting the next day.Original
However, he asked that the matter stated in his letter and the line of reform be discussed once he had returned to office.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that this makes clear his return to office was conditional on reform of shogunate government.Original
Makino Tadamasa followed suit.Original
Abe Masahiro withdrew, weeping with emotion.Original
Though as the senior-most of the senior councilors he could not escape the blame for having relaxed the laws of the realm, far from being charged with any fault he had received this great command—how could he fail to exert himself.Original
After this, he never again requested dismissal.Original
The letter accepting his return to office states the following.Original
He had been suffering since the previous days from a genuine ailment of chest pain, and various matters had intervened to delay him.Original
Since there had been a command from the shogun, he could not defy it; in awe, he had relied on the shogun’s will and accepted his return to office.Original
And in one line: what would become of the situation from here on.Original
In a postscript he wrote: the burning of Kyoto was a matter of astonishment; on top of that enormous expenses would be incurred, and when he thought of how to manage the finances he could find no peace in eating or sleeping; he could only sigh deeply at what times these were.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryThe Notice of the Ninth Day of the Fourth Month
The day before the resignation letter, the ninth day of the fourth month.Original
A document was issued, under the name of Makino Tadamasa as the month’s duty officer among the coastal defense officers, to the senior and junior inspectors.Original
The American ships that had come this time had sailed out of the inland sea.Original
While the ships remained, there had been willful and unrestrained conduct, and it had been hard to foresee whether this might unexpectedly open hostilities.Original
Orders for defense had been given to each, but since naval preparations were not yet complete, a peaceable course of action had unavoidably been adopted.Original
Castaways were to be cared for, and when ships passed, firewood, water, food, coal, and other goods lacking aboard were to be provided.Original
This request had been granted.
And in closing:
it was a proclamation ordering that economy be observed and that military preparations on land and sea be pursued with still greater effort.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō concludes that, viewed from one side, this appeared indeed to be a promotion of military preparedness, but in truth it exposed the shogunate’s true character of indecision.Original
This, it is said, is proof that there was no firm, settled view as to whether to open the country or close it.Original
In their hearts they knew the ports should be opened, yet with their mouths they spoke of expelling the barbarians.Original
Knowing that expelling the barbarians was impossible, they hesitated to state their true convictions openly, and outwardly dressed their words to match common opinion.Original
Thus they fell into a trap of their own making.Original
It was like stealing a bell while covering one’s own ears, and the shogunate-toppling strategists seized upon that very opening — this is how Sohō sees it.OriginalOriginal
A letter written by a certain person of that time is also quoted.Original
While the American ships remained, all the officials lost their color and seemed to have no life in them, but by the third day their complexions gradually returned and they regained their composure.Original
Such cowardice was beyond words.Original
No matter how firmly Tokugawa Nariaki alone held his convictions, nothing could be done when the camp was in such a state.Original
It was surely just as that, Sohō says.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryAn Indispensable Man
Many of the officials of the time had been recommended by him, and it was said that the shogunate had never had so many men of ability.Original
When he tried to resign his post, everyone regretted his departure and earnestly urged him to stay.Original
The wise Abe Masahiro felt the need to first submit his resignation and, setting aside for a while the question of whether he truly wished to leave the councils of the shogunate, to test a vote of confidence in himself from those above and below.Original
It should be seen, he says, that this was why he took this step.Original
If it was indeed a vote of confidence, then he achieved his purpose exactly.Original
For no matter how many plots were being hatched around him, he was at that time “an indispensable man.”Original
Through this matter of the resignation, his position became, if anything, all the firmer, Sohō concludes.Original
On the same ninth day of the fourth month, an order was also issued to Ii Naosuke.Original
Because foreign ships had of late frequently come to the nearby seas, the defense of the inland waters had been reformed, but it was not only the seas near Edo; the matter of guarding Kyoto too was thought of as ever more important.Original
Since his house had, from long before, been charged with the unforeseen defense of Kyoto, he was told to attend to it with even greater care.Original
Instructions concerning Haneda and Ōmori followed after this.Original
At the end of the ten days that had begun with headache and dizziness, Abe Masahiro was appointed director of the reconstruction of the imperial palace and wept with gratitude.Original
In that same month, the head of the Hikone house had been ordered to strengthen the defense of Kyoto.Original
Where would these two orders come to cross, four years later?Original
That spring, how far had the man who wrote “headache and dizziness” in his report actually seen?OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet Library| Source text | Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 32: The Conclusion of the Kanagawa Treaty (1935). National Diet Library Digital Collections (PDM). PID 1223901 |
| Checked against | Ishin shiryō kōyō, vol. 1 (1937). PID 1046665 |
| Dates and names | All 6 dates in the text exist in the calendar for their year, and the Western years given alongside them agree. Of the 11 people named in the text, 9 also appear in Ishin shiryō kōyō, vol. 1. |
| English gates | 146 of 146 sentences passed the checks on the English text. |
This article is a reading of Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 32: The Conclusion of the Kanagawa Treaty. Tokutomi Sohō’s views are those of the 1920s and 1930s and may differ from current scholarship. The source text is a century old and may differ from current scholarship.
