Katsu Kaishū was a colleague of Oguri, who received a salary from the shogunate. In the 2nd month of Keiō 4 (1868), Oguri, whose call for war failed to prevail, left his residence in Edo. For trying to borrow foreign troops, Oguri was called a traitor. Ninagawa Arata calls this a shallow insult and devotes a whole chapter to defending him.
What Ninagawa brings up first is that the Chōshū domain fired cannons at the imperial palace in Kyoto. At that time, the shogunate was a system of government that had lasted 700 years. Ninagawa sees it as a legitimate power that had commanded over 250 daimyo. His understanding is that it was the shogunate’s duty to subdue any domain that broke that order, and this was an expression of Oguri’s sense of responsibility. Ninagawa continues that many countries have examples of using foreign troops to unify their land, and that even 200 years earlier, in the Amakusa Rebellion, the shogunate had used a Dutch ship.
As people who held the same view, Ninagawa lists the scholar Fukuzawa Yukichi, Takenouchi Magosuke of Ki domain, and the senior councilor Ogasawara Iki no kami. His argument is that to see Oguri alone as responsible is a misunderstanding by careless people who merely heard rumors. On the other hand, among those who overthrew the shogunate, the Saga domain received new-model cannons from Britain. Saigō of the Eastern Expeditionary Force sent Kinashi Seiichirō and others to Yokohama to ask the British minister Parkes for assistance. If French assistance is to be blamed, Ninagawa asked back, would not British assistance be the same?
Oguri had argued that the daimyo system, which had lasted 700 years, should be reformed so that the nation would be ruled directly. According to Ninagawa, Oguri foresaw the trend that would inevitably come with the opening of the country. He tried to carry it through with the power of the government he served. Katsu Kaishū, hearing this idea, gave no answer at the time, but later wrote in the *Kaishū Chobun Kokukigen* that the Tokugawa house should first step down on its own.
Ninagawa declares that to say such a thing while still receiving a salary was an irresponsible remark lacking the loyalty expected of an official. Having left his residence, Oguri arrived on the 1st day of the 3rd month at Gonda in Ueno Province, the domain that had belonged to his family for 300 years. What he told Shibusawa Seiichirō, commander of the Shinbutai, the night before he left, was his intention to put down roots there and raise a peasant militia. On the morning of the 4th day, the village was surrounded on all sides and set on fire. By around noon, Oguri had driven them off by force.
Ninagawa reads this not as mere bandits but as a political mob, and views the figure of 7000 as propaganda from the government forces. After they left, one cannon remained by the roadside. A supervising officer, a certain Toyonaga, and others claimed this as proof of preparation for rebellion, using it as a pretext to kill Oguri. However, what had been ordered was his capture, not his execution. The talk of borrowing foreign troops ended as mere rumor, while the system Oguri had aimed for was realized by the very side that had treated him as an enemy.
It was the year when Ikeda Chikugo no kami, the envoy the shogunate had dispatched to France, was staying there.Original
In this year, a certain proposal was brought to the shogunate from the side of the French government, Ninagawa Arata writes.Original
Why not use the French navy to subdue Chōshū?OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryEven the word “traitor” was hurled at him.Original
Ninagawa calls this “shallow abuse” and spends an entire chapter defending against it.Original
Let us trace the course of that defense in order.OriginalOriginal
The cannon fire at Hamaguri Gate
What Ninagawa first sets down is the firing of guns by the Chōshū domain in Kyoto.Original
The organized official army of the Mōri domain fired cannon toward the imperial palace.Original
“There had never been, throughout the entire Tokugawa period, a danger to the imperial palace as sudden and grave as the Chōshū men’s assault on Hamaguri Gate,” Ninagawa writes.Original
He adds a line noting that the cannonballs fired were not some convenient organic matter that would strike only Aizu men.OriginalOriginal
Ninagawa holds that the shogunate of that time was a state institution of seven hundred years’ standing and the legitimate wielder of power.Original
More than two hundred fifty daimyo had all, since the third shogun’s time, attended the sankin-kōtai and served as vassals.Original
To subdue a domain that broke that order was the shogunate’s duty, and it was the “manifestation of a sense of responsibility” on the part of Oguri, who held high office in the shogunate—so Ninagawa understands it.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryHe was closely tied to the Aizu domain, and privately considered moving Aizu, then stationed in Tōhoku, to Sunpu.Original
Ninagawa has heard that the authorities of the Aizu domain also secretly sent people to investigate conditions in Sunpu.Original
However, this remains only as legend and not as any written record, Ninagawa himself cautions.Original
For the shortfall in national finances, foreign loans would be raised, and those funds applied to the subjugation of one or two powerful domains plotting the overthrow of the shogunate.OriginalOriginal
The Dutch ship of two hundred years before
Using foreign troops to unify the country—Original
there are many precedents for this in the diplomatic history of nations both past and present, Ninagawa says.Original
Two hundred years earlier, in the Amakusa Rebellion, the shogunate had already made use of a Dutch ship.Original
The shogunate, well versed in foreign affairs, could not have failed to know this precedent, and so, “as a last resort, sought skillfully to make use of foreigners,” he says.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryNinagawa further lists the names of others who held the same opinion.Original
The scholar Fukuzawa Yukichi was also one who submitted a memorial to the shogunate urging the use of foreign troops, and that memorial is presently in the keeping of Dr. Takimoto Seiichi, who himself told Ninagawa so.Original
It also appears in the memorial of Takenouchi Magosuke of the Ki domain.Original
The senior councilor Ogasawara Iki no kami also held this opinion.Original
“At the time, regarding this policy as acceptable was the general atmosphere among the shogunate’s side,” Ninagawa writes, concluding that to single out Oguri alone as responsible is “the misunderstanding of the rash, who listen to rumor.”OriginalOriginal
The precedents extend further, across the world.Original
Italy, aided by French forces, defeated Austria and achieved “the founding of Italy.”Original
Austria, when its capital was threatened by Turkey, was saved by French forces.Original
American independence was won through French arms and support, Greek independence through British military force and funds, and China’s Long-Haired Bandits were suppressed through British military strategy.Original
Even Bismarck’s unification at first borrowed the strength of Austria and Italy.Original
“Among nations, this is something one might call an ordinary matter”—so Ninagawa judges.OriginalOriginal
What, then, of the side that overthrew the shogunate?Original
The Saga domain received Armstrong guns from Britain and even used them in the attack on Aizu.Original
And the eastern expeditionary army, even after Yoshinobu had submitted, decided upon an attack on Edo; Saigō, chief staff officer of Satsuma, sent staff officers Kinashi Seiichirō and Watanabe to Yokohama to request aid from the British minister Parkes.Original
If aid from France is to be condemned, then surely aid from Britain ought to be condemned in the same way, he says.Original
The six-million-ryō loan
Still, Ninagawa does not see any deep attachment to France on the shogunate’s part.Original
The fact that France “lent one or two warships to Japan, yet refused to undertake even a mere six-million-ryō loan” makes it clear that there was no far-reaching, deeply persistent scheme, Ninagawa writes.OriginalOriginal
As Ninagawa sees it, what the shogunate’s authorities had in mind took the following shape.Original
They would repeat the same trick once used when British warships had been employed to drive off two Russian warships from Tsushima.Original
Have the French navy bombard the Chōshū coast, while the shogunate itself, using its own trained land troops, would chastise Chōshū.Original
If matters were as rumored in the world, this was “a scheme of expedient calculation that was bound, under the circumstances of the time, to be devised”—so Ninagawa judges.OriginalOriginal
This matter ended merely as rumor and was never realized.Original
That was “a fortunate thing.”Original
For the Japanese, advancing toward national unification without foreign aid was the most correct path, and he says he himself rejoices that it ended as nothing more than a rumor of borrowed troops.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryEven powerful domains of seven hundred years reduced to provinces at a stroke
It was Chōshū, surely, that first felt anger and fear upon hearing the rumor of borrowed troops, Ninagawa says.Original
Oguri and others insisted, “Let us abolish feudalism and reduce even the powerful domains of seven hundred years to provinces and districts at a single stroke.”OriginalOriginal
Ninagawa explains Oguri’s theory of a provincial-district system thus.Original
To conform to the great trend of the world and to set the Japanese people against the peoples of every other nation, one must first pacify the country, and then go further and reform the feudal system of seven hundred years into a “system of provinces and districts.”Original
Oguri had perceived through the inevitable trend that would accompany the opening of the country.Original
And he “wished to carry out this great undertaking himself, using the power of the government he currently bore responsibility for.”OriginalOriginal
The politics of the time was not government by public opinion but autocracy, and to carry things out on the strength of the authorities’ own confidence was political morality, Ninagawa says.Original
The stipends and status of the daimyo were things granted or recognized by the Tokugawa government.Original
If so, then it is clear as a matter of legal principle that the government has the right to reduce, of its own accord, what it had itself granted, he says.Original
If it is not considered wrong that Satsuma-Chōshū men, after the Restoration, advanced their own convictions in an age of autocracy, then surely Oguri’s aim of achieving a provincial-district system through the shogunate’s power ought to be justified by the same logic—this is Ninagawa’s argument.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryFall yourself first
Here, one person is summoned.Original
It is Katsu Kaishū, a colleague of Oguri who also received a stipend from the shogunate.OriginalOriginal
When Oguri advocated the prefectural system, Katsu did not answer at once.Original
In later years, Katsu wrote this in his own work, the Kaishū Chobun Kokukigen.Original
“The argument for prefectures must naturally arise when relations with all nations begin.”Original
But it would be quite wrong for the Tokugawa house to cut down the lords and hold power itself; “one must first fall of one’s own accord, reduce oneself without regard, select the worthy and raise the able, and stand in a position where one need feel no shame before the realm with sincerity of heart—only then should this be accomplished.”OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryTo say “fall first of your own accord” while eating the stipend of the shogunate is the talk of an irresponsible man lacking loyalty as an official, Ninagawa declares.Original
If one falls first, one’s convictions perish and the path to promoting the worthy is also lost; “the loyal retainer dies in his own indignation, and the able retainer, shunned, is cut down by his opponents.”Original
Kawaji Saemon no jō was such a case, Oguri was such a case, and the sufferings of the Aizu domain were the same, Ninagawa cites as examples.OriginalOriginal
That Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote the Yasegaman no Setsu and struck a heavy blow at Katsu is something any person of feeling cannot help but cry out in agreement with, Ninagawa says.Original
That the British minister Satow, in later years, described Katsu to a certain person of the former shogunate side as “a man who did no good for the Tokugawa government” also hits the mark.Original
That Kurimoto Jōn, who disliked Katsu, on one occasion in the middle of the Meiji era, shouted loudly before a gathering of old acquaintances, “Katsu, step down!” is also “truly understandable as Kurimoto’s feeling,” he says.OriginalOriginal
Katsu himself composed the verse: “The thin frog gets by with nothing but bowing.”Original
Ninagawa quotes this verse and writes that Katsu was that kind of person.Original
He was undoubtedly a great talent skilled in every scheme and stratagem, but he was of an entirely different type from Oguri.Original
Oguri was a loyal retainer of an illustrious house descended from the Matsudaira clan, while Katsu was a lowly retainer who had risen from outside.Original
“Between the thinking of the two there was naturally a difference like that between blood and water”—this is Ninagawa’s conclusion.OriginalOriginal
The Twenty-Eighth Day of the Second Month of Keiō 4, Surugadai
The argument for war was not accepted.Original
On the twenty-eighth day of the second month of Keiō 4 (1868), Oguri vacated his upper residence in Kanda Surugadai, and on the first day of the third month he arrived at Gonda in Kōzuke province, the fief that had belonged to his family for three hundred years.Original
At the Surugadai residence stood the only stone Western-style building in Edo, built by Oguri; later Hijikata Hisamoto of Tosa occupied and lived there, preserving the main house and the Western-style building as a memorial, Ninagawa records.OriginalOriginal
On the night before leaving Edo, Oguri spoke to Shibusawa Seiichirō, commander of the Shinbutai.Original
He said that he had, from the outset, argued for opening hostilities on the basis of his own judgment, but it was not carried out.Original
Now that his lord had submitted, there was no justification left to stand on.Original
“From now I shall depart and settle in my fief at Gonda, win over the people, raise farmer-soldiers, and if events call for it rise up boldly; if nothing happens, I shall end my days as a stubborn commoner.”Original
Compared to Ōtori and Enomoto, Miyake Setsurei’s assessment that it was “the ratio of a hawk to a kite” hits the mark, Ninagawa writes.OriginalOriginal
Oguri wrapped up the one cannon that had been kept at his entrance along with several rifles, packed them into a long chest, and carried them off.Original
Because of its weight, petty-minded people in the world rumored that he must have hidden several hundred thousand ryō of the shogunate’s official gold.Original
“Petty people look at others with a petty mind,” Ninagawa says.OriginalOriginal
At Gonda there was no house for him, so he lodged at the temple Tōzenji.Original
He built a residence on a flat area atop a small hill called Kannonyama, tried to draw river water to make paddy fields, and daily supervised the work on horseback.Original
That area still remains today, and the villagers know it well, Ninagawa records.OriginalOriginal
On the morning of the fourth day, Gonda was surrounded on all four sides, fires were set in five places, and gunfire was heavy.Original
Oguri, unable to let this stand, drove them off by force, and by around noon had chased them away.OriginalOriginal
Ninagawa does not view this as a simple band of bandits.Original
The number seven thousand was surely propaganda from the imperial army side, likely a means to spread the claim that “Oguri had military preparations strong enough to repel even seven thousand men.”Original
In the memorial that Yoshinobu presented to the court in the first month, it states: “The retainers conspired with wandering vagrants, gathered at the residence, forced their way into the city of Edo, and committed robbery,” and “there are clear traces of them going on to commit arson and plunder in Yashū and Sōshū as well.”Original
This means that retainers of the Satsuma domain gathered rōnin, committed robbery in Edo, and left clear traces of arson and plunder in Yashū and Sōshū.Original
Later, in a report written by Ōne Ryūtarō, it likewise states: “The farmers, resenting the harsh government of the former shogunate, rose up.”Original
Ninagawa reads this as a confession, in the claim that farmers resenting the harsh government of the former shogunate rose up, that they were themselves politically motivated rioters.Original
He adds that the historical fact of Saigō releasing rōnin into the Kantō region is also clearly recorded in Dr. Hagino Yoshiyuki’s Ōsei Fukko no Rekishi.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryThe One Cannon
After the driven-off rioters departed, a cannon set up beside the road remained.Original
It was that same cannon that had been displayed at the entrance in Edo.Original
The army inspector Toyonaga and others, seeing this, declared “there was a cannon set in place,” making it out to be preparation for rebellion, and made it the sole convenient pretext for killing Oguri, Ninagawa writes.Original
How could one cannon possibly stand against the imperial army composed of all the domains of the realm? Ninagawa mocks.OriginalOriginal
However, Ninagawa emphasizes that this was an order for “pursuit and capture,” not an “order for killing.”OriginalOriginal
The borrowing of troops ended as mere rumor.Original
The prefectural system was in the end brought about by the hands of the very side that Oguri had treated as the enemy.Original
The single cannon set beside the road in Gonda may have been the final form of that whole consistent course.
Between those who read it as proof of rebellion and those who read it as proof of loyalty, which of them was truly seeing Oguri?Original
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Open the original page at the National Diet Library| Source text | Ishin zengo no seisō to Oguri Kōzuke no shi (1928). National Diet Library Digital Collections (PDM). PID 1876405 |
| Dates and names | All 2 dates in the text exist in the calendar for their year, and the Western years given alongside them agree. The 3 people named in the text were checked word for word against the source text. No entries have been prepared yet for vol. 8, so no comparison with it was made. |
| English gates | 111 of 111 sentences passed the checks on the English text. |
This article is a reading of Ishin zengo no seisō to Oguri Kōzuke no shi. Ninagawa Arata’s books (1928-31) are written from the standpoint of the shogunate’s retainers. The source text is a century old and may differ from current scholarship.
