In the 5th month of Ansei 5 (1858), Kawaji Toshiakira, who as finance magistrate also served concurrently as coastal defense officer (responsible for sea defenses), submitted a memorandum to senior councilor Hotta Masayoshi. The date was the 3rd. This was 10 days after Ii Naosuke took the post of great elder.
The memorandum first lists the current circumstances. Kawaji wrote that because the emperor’s response had been unexpected, opinions were once again sought from the three branch houses and those below them, that he had read Owari’s and Mito’s answers on the 2nd, that their gist was that the treaty was unacceptable, and that this had left him greatly troubled. If the promise were broken, it would give the other side a pretext and lead to war; if the treaty were signed, it would go against the sentiments of the people at home and would leave the future unsettled. He also wrote that, having been ordered to accompany the party to Kyoto and having seen for himself how far from easy the situation there was, he had suffered to the point of forgetting sleep and food.
Kawaji therefore argued that if the more manageable of the two matters were dealt with first, both would proceed smoothly. He suggested that the true aim behind this response might instead lie in the question of who would become the shogun’s successor. He continued: once the successor was decided, might not the treaty matter also be settled quietly and permitted? Shimazu Nariakira and Matsudaira Yoshinaga among others had already made representations to this effect; if the choice fell on the one who commanded popular trust, might not order be maintained from the emperor above down to the people below? Tokutomi Sohō adds a note that in the atmosphere of Kyoto, opposition to the treaty and the push to install the Hitotsubashi house had simply come to look as one before anyone noticed, and writes that Kawaji regarded fixing the succession as a means of quelling every dispute.
Then why had he not submitted it sooner, Sohō asks. Until he left Edo in the New Year, Kawaji’s stance had remained unclear, and even when Matsudaira Yoshinaga sent Hashimoto Tsunanori to draw out his true feelings, Kawaji had deflected him, answering that there were matters he could not take on. Yet he submitted this memorandum only after returning from Kyoto, just as the Kishū faction was on the verge of all but securing victory. Sohō says that if one holding such an important office had remained ignorant of this great matter, it would be too careless to credit, and he lays down his pen there, saying there is no way to judge whether Kawaji had felt he was administering medicine to a patient past recovery, or whether he had reached his final resolve out of anxiety closing in around him.
On the 5th he was summoned, and on the 6th Kawaji was transferred to rusui of the Nishinomaru. Sohō writes that although this carried a stipend of 2,000 koku and shodaibu rank (a seat of a certain formal standing), it was in fact an idle post as keeper of an empty castle, dropping 20 ranks in precedence. According to Kawaji’s biography, when the great elder saw the memorandum he flew into a rage, saying that for someone of that rank to raise so grave a matter was an overstepping of authority, and was ready to inflict any punishment, but a senior councilor at his side, probably Hotta, calmed him and the matter was kept to a demotion. Even before taking office, Ii Naosuke had flatly called Kawaji a bad character in a letter to Nagano Shuzen, and Sohō judges that this memorandum was without doubt the immediate cause that drove Ii to carry out his sweeping measures.
On the same date, the 6th, the senior inspector Toki Yorimune was also transferred to senior guard captain. Utsugi’s letter reports that the opposing side lost color, their allies leapt for joy, and the castle fell quiet, and states that there was an intention to gradually clear out the rest as well. According to the records of the Ii house, on the 7th it was indicated that the succession would go to Kishū, and that Hotta would be dismissed from office for negligence in Kyoto. From the opposing side came voices saying that those who spoke honest opinions were disliked, that Toki, Kawaji, Udono and others were being transferred one after another, and that everyone was astonished. Sohō writes that Kawaji was in the end made nothing more than Ii’s first sacrifice, and records that from this point the sweeping measures began to be carried out one by one.
The mere 4 days from the memorandum to the demotion can be followed through Kawaji’s biography, the letter dated the 5th day of the 5th month that Iwase Tadanari sent to Hashimoto Tsunanori, the account of Mizuno Tadanori, Utsugi’s letter, the records of the Ii house, and Sohō’s commentary.
The third day of the fifth month of Ansei 5 (1858).Original
It was submitted to the senior councilor Hotta Masayoshi.Original
Kawaji had been prepared for this from the outset, Tokutomi Sohō surmises.OriginalOriginal
Naosuke had become great elder ten days before this.Original
A confidential letter that Nagano Shuzen gave to Shimada Sakon relates this.Original
Some said, “If this is made public, it will be a serious matter.”Original
Naosuke overruled them, saying, “There is no reason to handle privately a matter that has been publicly declared.”Original
This meant that there was no reason to treat privately something that had been openly declared.Original
The decision was made at once.OriginalOriginal
表にて被仰出候事を內證にて御取扱之筋者有間敷旨御爭論にて申上に相成候處
Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryKawaji’s sealed memorial was thus placed before this great elder.OriginalOriginal
Regarding the Selection of an Heir as a Means to Pacify All Matters
The memorial first enumerates the present situation.Original
Because of the unexpected imperial reply, the three branch houses and others below them were consulted again.Original
The answers from Owari and Mito had been seen on the second day.Original
According to word from Kyoto, the purport was that the treaty was not acceptable.Original
“I am greatly perplexed.”Original
Kawaji writes that he is deeply troubled.OriginalOriginal
If the signing were broken, the other side would have a pretext, and war would be inevitable.Original
If it were signed, it would go against domestic sentiment, and the country would not remain settled thereafter.Original
“I worry about it day and night.”Original
He worries day and night.Original
Having been ordered to accompany the party to the capital and having seen firsthand the unsettled state of Kyoto, he says he forgot sleep and food in his distress.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryFrom this a stratagem emerges.Original
If the easier of the two matters to handle is settled, both will be accomplished.Original
“Is not the true intent of this matter, in essence, the weightier concern?”Original
Kawaji declared plainly that the true intent of the imperial reply lay, rather, in the selection of an heir.Original
Tokutomi Sohō says it only appeared that, within the atmosphere of Kyoto, opposition to the treaty and support for Hitotsubashi had merged before anyone noticed.OriginalOriginal
Kawaji writes further.Original
If the heir were announced, then even if the treaty did not proceed as the imperial reply demanded, “would not the other matters also be quietly permitted?”Original
Would not the other matters also be quietly permitted?
Shimazu Nariakira, Matsudaira Yoshinaga, and others had already put forward proposals concerning the heir.Original
If a decision were made in favor of the one to whom popular hopes turned, then “from the emperor above to the lords below, and even down to the common people, might not this one matter alone bring quiet order?”Original
From the emperor above to the lords below, down to the common people, might not this one matter alone bring quiet order?Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that Kawaji regarded the selection of an heir as a means of pacifying every entanglement at once.OriginalOriginal
The Noncommittal Reply and the Nine-Tenths Certainty
Until he left Edo in the first month, Kawaji’s attitude had been noncommittal.Original
When Matsudaira Yoshinaga sent Hashimoto Tsunanori to draw out his true feelings, Kawaji’s written reply was as follows.Original
He praised the visitor, saying that although it was their first meeting, his arguments were reasoned and detailed, and he was, with all respect, impressed.Original
He continued, “There are also matters I cannot undertake to accept.”Original
He deflected the request, saying there were things he could not agree to.Original
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryYet after returning from Kyoto, just as the Kishū faction was on the verge of a near-certain, nine-tenths-assured victory, he submitted this memorial.Original
Tokutomi Sohō says Kawaji probably was not well informed of the inner situation.Original
But he adds that it must be called too careless for a man in a key post, serving as both finance magistrate and coastal defense officer, to have been entirely unaware of this great matter.OriginalOriginal
Was it the mindset of one who administers medicine while knowing the patient will not recover?Original
Or, aware that danger was closing in on him moment by moment, had he made his final resolve?Original
“That is beyond mere conjecture.”OriginalOriginal
At the end of the memorial, Kawaji wrote as follows.Original
Even if the barbarians consented, domestic sentiment remained unsettled, and unexpectedly grave harm might arise, of the kind seen in “over ninety court nobles forcing their way in upon the chancellor.”Original
“The matter of the American barbarians is urgent, but there is a matter even more pressing than that.”OriginalOriginal
Even before becoming great elder, Naosuke had, in a letter given to Nagano Shuzen, plainly called Kawaji a man of “wicked evil.”Original
Even those close to Kawaji regarded him as cunning and difficult to fathom.Original
Setting aside for the moment the reason why Kawaji ventured to submit so bold a memorial, Tokutomi Sohō writes that it is an undeniable fact that this became the immediate cause driving Ii to carry out his sweeping purge.OriginalOriginal
Rusui of Nishinomaru, Twenty Ranks Down
On the fifth day of the fifth month, a summons was issued.Original
On the sixth day, he was transferred to rusui of Nishinomaru.Original
It carried a stipend of two thousand koku, and he held the rank of shodaifu.Original
But Tokutomi Sohō records that it was in truth merely a guardian of an empty castle, a sinecure whose salary, and indeed rank, fell twenty grades lower.OriginalOriginal
Kawaji’s biography relates this.Original
The sealed memorial happened to pass before the great elder’s glance.Original
The original note surmises that Hotta presented it to the shogun, and the shogun passed it down to the great elder.
The great elder was greatly angered.Original
“For one of his rank to offer advice on so grave a matter is an act of overreach; it cannot be left unaddressed for a moment.”Original
To offer advice on so grave a matter from that rank was an overreach, he said, and it could not be left unaddressed even for an instant.Original
With the momentum to inflict any punishment whatsoever, the councilor seated nearby—probably Hotta—soothed him by every means and limited it to a demotion.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō writes that this observation is probably not far from the mark.Original
However, Kawaji’s reputation over the Kyoto mission was extremely poor.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that if one sought whoever was responsible for the failure, Iwase Tadanari, though second in rank, should be placed first.Original
Because it was he who had urged Hotta to go to Kyoto and had been entrusted with all the documents.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that perhaps the reason the world blamed only Kawaji despite this was that he had resorted to too many petty stratagems.OriginalOriginal
Mizuno Tadanori, chief retainer attached to Tayasu, describes one scene of this poor reputation.Original
“Saemon no jō too will surely be transferred out this time.”Original
Kawaji too would be transferred elsewhere this time, he said.OriginalOriginal
There had been many blunders in Kyoto, and not a few matters had been mishandled because of them.Original
Iwase Tadanari wrote out the details at length and submitted them for Hotta’s reference.Original
Hotta, without much thought, forwarded it to the Kantō.Original
The councilors too did not examine it closely, and passed it down to the deliberative body together with the papers forwarded from Kyoto.Original
It was opened for reading at a session attended by the three magistrates—the finance, city, and temple-and-shrine magistrates.Original
It was a document setting out the elder brother’s negligence.Original
Those who listened, guessing his true feelings, could not help but find it ridiculous, and one by one, using various pretexts, they left their seats, until few remained.Original
“Saemon no jō’s carelessness can no longer be concealed, and one cannot help but be reminded of the councilors’ carelessness as well.”Original
Mizuno concluded that Kawaji’s negligence could no longer be hidden, and that the councilors’ carelessness too could be inferred.OriginalOriginal
If so, might not that memorial have been submitted as something meant to “strike first and control others”?Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that this too is an observation with some basis.OriginalOriginal
Meanwhile, Iwase Tadanari, who had gone to Kyoto together with Kawaji, wrote the following to Hashimoto Tsunanori, dated the fifth day of the fifth month.Original
“Today a notice suddenly came down to the finance official Kawaji.”Original
It seems Asano Senshū too was summoned; Ōkubo, city magistrate of Sunpu, was summoned the day before yesterday—perhaps this concerns a post attached to the Imperial Palace, he added.Original
As for Matsudaira Masayuki, who had submitted a memorial on the Kishū adopted-heir theory, it was like “three in the morning, four in the evening,” he said.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that Iwase too had probably not known of this beforehand as a settled fact.OriginalOriginal
The demotions were not limited to Kawaji.Original
On the same date, the sixth day of the fifth month, the senior inspector Toki Yorimune was transferred to guard captain.OriginalOriginal
“It is said that the Nishinomaru matter has been decided according to the wishes, and will be announced before long.”Original
The Nishinomaru heir was decided according to the great elder’s wishes, and would be announced shortly, it was said.Original
If that happened, “the conspiring side would collapse and crumble all at once.”Original
The conspiring side would collapse all at once.Original
He was repeatedly summoned by the shogun: “his authority grows greater with each passing day, and the castle too seems set to be transformed entirely.”Original
His authority was growing greater by the day, and the castle seemed on the verge of complete change, it was said.OriginalOriginal
In a letter dated the ninth, because of the demotions of Kawaji and Toki and the summoning of Asano Nakatsukasa: “those of like mind lost their color, the loyal and righteous leapt for joy, and the camp fell silent and orderly.”Original
The opposing faction lost its composure, allies rejoiced, and the castle grew quiet.Original
The intention was to root out all remaining members, but since binding them all at once would be detrimental to official business, the wish was to cleanse them gradually, it was said.OriginalOriginal
Records of the Ii house stand alongside these.Original
On the seventh day of the fifth month, Naosuke alone was summoned, and an instruction was given that the adopted heir would come from Kishū, and that Hotta, owing to his negligence in Kyoto, was to be dismissed from his post.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that this shows the Kishū question had already been settled, and that Hotta’s retirement had become only a matter of time.Original
Tokutomi Sohō also writes that, although it is all recorded as if entirely on Iesada’s own initiative, it is not clear who was the initiator and who was the passive party.OriginalOriginal
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Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryOn the ninth day of the fifth month, at the hour of seven and a half, that is, five o’clock in the afternoon, Yakushiji, Chikuzen no kami, came and spoke until the hour of six and a half, seven o’clock, and a rice dish in hot water was served.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that during this time there were not a few who ran about currying favor with Ii and scheming to entrap the opposition.OriginalOriginal
On the twelfth day of the fifth month, Naosuke again had an audience alone, and received the shogun’s private intentions regarding the handling of the foreign barbarians and the decision on the adopted heir.Original
According to another letter of Utsugi’s, the shogun sighed, “There is nothing so fearsome as scheming, flattering men.”Original
Nothing is more fearsome than treacherous, flattering men, he said.Original
It was the shogun’s instruction that personnel changes be held off for a while, and that removing them only after everyone recognized the shogun’s wisdom would make his authority shine the more.Original
Utsugi reported that unless the Nishinomaru matter were settled as soon as possible, it would be hard to gauge the schemes of the wicked, and that although he wished to announce it within five or six days, it was inconvenient because, unfortunately, Matsudaira Tadakata and Kuze Hirochika had withdrawn from duty.OriginalOriginal
There were also voices from the opposing side.Original
“Those who speak proper arguments and plain truths are despised, and already, in recent days, men of resolve among the officials—Toki Tanba, Kawaji Saemon, Udono Minbu, and others—have one by one been ordered transferred.”Original
Those who spoke honestly and plainly were despised, and officials of resolve such as Toki, Kawaji, and Udono were, one after another, ordered to be transferred, it said.Original
“Everyone was struck with fear and astonishment.”Original
Everyone was startled and alarmed.Original
There was also a rumor that Iwase too would soon be dismissed.OriginalOriginal
Dated the eighteenth day of the sixth month.Original
“I was astonished to hear of the recent transfer. But in times such as these, I think it is, on the contrary, something to be relieved about.”Original
He was astonished at this transfer.Original
But in times like these, he thought it was, rather, cause for relief, he said.Original
He expressed his gratitude for the great kindness he had received until then, and at the end wrote, “Though it comes last, please give my kind regards to your wife.”Original
He added, at the very end, a request to be remembered kindly to her ladyship.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō writes that even a man like Shimazu Nariakira must have felt surprise at Kawaji’s reassignment.Original
He then writes, “Kawaji was, in the end, nothing more than the first sacrifice offered up by Ii.”Original
That is to say, he was the first victim.Original
From this point, Ii’s policy of purging began to be carried out one step at a time.OriginalOriginal
A sealed letter, written on the third day of the fifth month and sent to the empty castle on the sixth.Original
Was it medicine given to a sick man, or a move made to get the better of an opponent before he could act?Original
Might it not be worth considering once more the question that Sohō left unresolved, together with the image of the Nishinomaru rusui opening a letter of sympathy in the summer heat?OriginalOriginal
| Source text | Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 39: The Administration of Ii Naosuke (1935). National Diet Library Digital Collections (PDM). PID 1223976 |
| Checked against | Ishin shiryō kōyō, vol. 2. PID 1046669 |
| Dates and names | All 9 dates in the text exist in the calendar for their year, and the Western years given alongside them agree. Of the 10 people named in the text, 9 also appear in Ishin shiryō kōyō, vol. 2. |
| English gates | 129 of 129 sentences passed the checks on the English text. |
This article is a reading of Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 39: The Administration of Ii Naosuke. Tokutomi Sohō’s views are those of the 1920s and 1930s and may differ from current scholarship. The source text is a century old and may differ from current scholarship.
