On the 12th day of the 6th month of Ansei 5 (1858), Utsugi Rokunojō visited Manabe as a messenger. He was a messenger ordered to talk things over thoroughly before returning. There were two topics: a provisional arrangement, and whether Sakai Wakasa no kami could be made envoy to the court. Manabe answered that someone familiar with the conditions in Kyoto would be better.
Manabe’s advancement was swift: in the 5th month of Tenpō 2 he became assistant in charge of temple and shrine affairs, in Tenpō 7 he became Osaka castle warden, and in the 4th month of Tenpō 9 he became Kyoto shoshidai. As shoshidai, he had toilets set up in the streets of Kyoto, and had wooden signposts marked with directions put up on street corners. In the first month of Tenpō 11 he joined the senior offices of the shogunate, and for the following 15 years he spent his days enjoying poetry, calligraphy and painting, and copying Buddhist sutras. Then, on the 23rd day of the 6th month, he was again chosen for a senior office and ordered to take charge of finances and foreign affairs.
His colleagues’ view of him was a cold one. According to Kuze, Manabe had wanted the post himself, but was unfamiliar with foreign affairs. Because he spoke of Kyoto as if it were in the palm of his hand, from his old experience as shoshidai, there were fears he might blunder. There is also a story that he spoke of foreigners in the same way as dogs. Kuze’s answer when Date asked about Sakai Tadaaki and Ōta is also found in the Sakumu Kiji.
Tokutomi Sohō harshly judges Manabe as a mere tool who simply followed Ii’s wishes, with no view of his own. The shogunate’s arrangement placed Sakai Tadaaki on the front line and Manabe on the second line. Tokutomi Sohō reads a letter from Ii’s confidant Nagano Yoshikoto as follows. It says that Honda Tadamoto was fair-minded and of no use as a tool, and so was replaced. The same letter also held the expectation that things would be easier to control if those behind hidden plots were punished before going up to Kyoto.
It also states, however, that because of what people would say, this should be done after the envoy’s duties were finished. This became the decision of the 4th day of the 7th month, carried out on the 5th. Tokutomi Sohō thinks that the shogun’s grave illness probably changed the schedule. He also writes that although Manabe was a shallow-minded man, the one who wrote the script was not shallow. Sakai Tadaaki informed Kyoto that Manabe would follow him up to the capital.
His arrival in Kyoto was on the 10th day of the 7th month. Umeda Unpin, a former retainer of the Sakai house now a masterless samurai, wrote that agreeing with Ii would make one an enemy of the court. On the 16th day of the 7th month, a draft of the document Manabe was to bring to Kyoto was completed. In the 7th month of Ansei 5, the Ii faction was at the height of its power, and Kyoto was the only place that would not go as they wished. Tokutomi Sohō’s fairest judgment is that most of the blame for the Bogo Purge lies with the shogunate, and above all with Ii.
From the selection of the envoy to his entry into Kyoto, the course of events can be followed through the records of the Ii house, the Sakumu Kiji, and the letters of Nagano Yoshikoto.
The secret conference of Ii and Manabe
The twelfth day of the sixth month of Ansei 5 (1858).OriginalOriginal
The records of the Ii house say of this messenger, “He was ordered to talk the matter over thoroughly before returning.”Original
This means that Ii was instructed to discuss things well before coming back.Original
When a letter was sent through an attendant, a meeting was arranged shortly after.Original
There were two matters to discuss.
One was the provisional treaty.OriginalOriginal
“As for the envoy to the imperial court, how would it be to send Sakai Wakasa no kami?”Original
Manabe answered.Original
His reply was that someone familiar with conditions in Kyoto would be best, and that Wakasa no kami would do well.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō writes that the relationship between Ii and Manabe apparently began after Manabe’s attendance at Edo at the end of this fifth month.Original
On the eleventh day of the sixth month, Ii waited for Manabe to withdraw after Manabe’s formal attendance ceremony, and then received him.Original
Then came this meeting on the twelfth.Original
The *Ansei Kiji* records simply: “Manabe thereupon took part in the secret conference.”OriginalOriginal
Please consult the original page images for this source.
Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryAt this time, Tokutomi Sohō says, neither Ii nor Manabe dreamed that the treaty would be signed on the nineteenth day of the sixth month.Original
That Sakai alone sufficed as envoy was because this was still before the signing.OriginalOriginal
Fifteen years in obscurity
What sort of man was Manabe Akikatsu?OriginalOriginal
He was the castle lord of Echizen Sabae, with a domain of fifty thousand koku.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that, as the adopted son of his predecessor Akimasa, he was accomplished in both literary and military arts, and well versed in the conditions of common life.Original
Just as Abe Masahiro, Hotta Masayoshi, and Ii Naosuke had all succeeded to their houses as younger sons or younger brothers, Manabe too, it is said, was one of the able adopted-son lords.Original
Tokutomi Sohō’s view is that there is no need to argue that Manabe was no ordinary daimyo.OriginalOriginal
His career advanced quickly.Original
In the fifth month of Tenpō 2 he was appointed additional magistrate of temples and shrines.Original
In Tenpō 7 he became castle warden of Osaka.Original
In the fourth month of Tenpō 9 he became shoshidai of Kyoto.Original
While shoshidai, he had privies set up in the streets of Kyoto, and had wooden signs put up at street corners noting which block, which street, and which area one was entering.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that although a small matter, it has been handed down in his biography as an example of his benevolent governance.Original
In Tenpō 10 he is said to have exerted himself as overseer of repairs to the Sentō Palace, for which he was granted a hand-warming brazier.Original
In the first month of Tenpō 11 he joined the ranks of senior councilors with the privilege of countersigning.Original
Tokutomi Sohō describes this as “rising like an eel climbing upstream.”OriginalOriginal
It is said that this was because he differed in opinion from Mizuno Tadakuni, but Tokutomi Sohō’s view is that it was probably rather because he had been of little use to Mizuno’s Tenpō-era administration.OriginalOriginal
Fifteen years then passed.Original
He immersed himself in the refined pursuits of poetry, writing, painting, and the games of go and chess, and alongside these he copied out and recited Buddhist sutras.OriginalOriginal
That man of idle leisure was, on the twenty-third day of the sixth month of Ansei 5, again raised to the ranks of senior councilor with countersigning privilege, and charged with the finance portfolio and the foreign affairs portfolio.Original
Tokutomi Sohō asks, “Now why was this? This is the very question.”OriginalOriginal
The answer lies in the previous day.Original
On the following, the twenty-third, he joined the ranks of countersigners together with Ōta Dōjun and Matsudaira Noriyasu.Original
When Nariaki and the others argued that Matsudaira Yoshinaga should be recommended as great elder, Manabe said, half in jest, that just as one could not turn the three branch houses into four, one great elder was enough, reducing the whole gathering to laughter.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that this shows how hard Manabe worked to repay the kindness of one who recognized his worth.OriginalOriginal
Though one of the senior councilors, Manabe was “a sycophant who had received Ii’s intentions” — that is, one who simply followed as told, no more than Ii’s instrument.Original
He had no independent insight, conviction, or ambition of his own.Original
He was neither a great villain nor a great man.Original
Yet Tokutomi Sohō writes that the work he carried out became one of the darkest and most tragic chapters in the history of the Restoration.OriginalOriginal
閣老の一人ではあるが、寧ろ井伊の意を承けたる詭隨者であつて、云はゞ井伊の手先であつたに過ぎない。
Open the original page at the National Diet Library“As if Kyoto were in his grasp”
Manabe was to go to Kyoto.Original
Around the time this was decided, his colleagues’ assessments of him were harsh.OriginalOriginal
Please consult the original page images for this source.
Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryKuze said that as for the envoy, Manabe himself “wished for it, saying that since he had experience from his earlier years as shoshidai, Kyoto affairs were as if already in his grasp.”Original
This means that it was a post he had sought for himself, and that because he had once served as shoshidai, he spoke of Kyoto affairs as though they were already in the palm of his hand.Original
Kuze added that although Manabe was ignorant of foreign affairs, he boasted of himself with such nonchalance that failure was to be feared.
Tokutomi Sohō’s view is that since this was the remark of a colleague, it was probably his true feeling.OriginalOriginal
It is recorded that Manabe was “a shallow-minded braggart” who knew nothing of Britain, Russia, or America, and said that the foreigners were “just like dogs.”Original
Manabe is said to have remarked that even if a dog strayed into the garden there was no cause for suspicion or worry, that anyone could drive it out or catch it, and that a consul, for all the name, amounted to nothing.OriginalOriginal
On the same day, when Date asked Kuze about Sakai Tadaaki and Ōta, Kuze answered, according to the *Sakumu Kiji*, that Sakai too was uninformed about current matters, and that Ōta, though he remembered old affairs, was careless and slow regarding present circumstances.Original
Tokutomi Sohō writes that with “such a cabinet, such special envoys” negotiating with Kyoto, anyone would have had cause for concern.OriginalOriginal
First line Sakai, second line Manabe
The shogunate’s arrangement placed Sakai Tadaaki in the first line and Manabe Akikatsu in the second.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō reads the reason Sakai replaced Honda Tadamoto as shoshidai from a letter by Nagano Yoshikoto.Original
Nagano was Ii’s trusted confidant.Original
Tokutomi Sohō’s reading is that Honda was comparatively fair-minded, and so was not useful enough to serve as Ii’s instrument.OriginalOriginal
In the same letter, a code word “○actor” appears.Original
Nagano and Shimada treated Miya as an enemy and were eager to expose his hidden faults, but Honda did not do so.Original
Sakai too is well aware of that matter, Nagano writes.OriginalOriginal
Sakai himself was serving as shoshidai of Kyoto for the second time.Original
From the eleventh month of Tenpō 14 to the seventh month of Kaei 3, a span of eight years by count, six years and nine months in actual terms.Original
He must have been one of the men skilled in Kyoto affairs, Tokutomi Sohō writes.OriginalOriginal
There is one more point to note in Nagano’s letter.Original
It says there was also a view that, “once the conspirators are punished, if His Lordship then goes up to Kyoto, matters will settle easily,” but since that would invite public talk, it should be after Manabe’s mission was completed.Original
This means there was an argument that going up to Kyoto after carrying out the punishments first would make things easier to settle, but since that would invite public criticism, it should wait until after the envoy’s mission was finished.Original
Tokutomi Sohō sees the fact that this was decided on the fourth day of the seventh month and carried out on the fifth as due to the shogun’s grave illness, or more precisely his critical condition, which suddenly changed the schedule.OriginalOriginal
The Ii faction did not march into Kyoto with indifference.Original
They carried out every possible reconnaissance and preparation, then later sent Manabe at leisure, aiming to strike at the very root in one stroke.Original
“Manabe was a shallow-minded man, but the author of that scenario was by no means shallow-minded,” Tokutomi Sohō writes.OriginalOriginal
何れにしても井伊派は、決して無關心には京都に乘り込まなかつた
Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryIt announces that Honda was given the rank of tamezume, that Sakai was appointed shoshidai, and that Manabe would go up to Kyoto later as envoy regarding the matter of dealing with foreign countries.Original
He arrived in Kyoto on the tenth day of the seventh month.Original
Around the same time, on the twenty-fifth day of the sixth month, it was also reported to the throne that Tokugawa Yoshitomi would be made the adopted heir.Original
Shogun Tokugawa Iesada had already died on the sixth day of the seventh month, but the announcement was made on the eighth day of the eighth month, Tokutomi Sohō records.OriginalOriginal
This is a document worth noting for how it makes clear his position as shoshidai, Tokutomi Sohō says.OriginalOriginal
Sakai first speaks of their old friendship.Original
Next, of his lineage.Original
He says that ever since his ancestor Sakai Tadakatsu received Wakasa as his fief, it had been the family’s hereditary teaching from generation to generation to hold the court in esteem.Original
Tadakatsu was a wise minister of the early Tokugawa period, and the Sakai house had inherited the scholarly line of Yamazaki Ansai; moreover Umeda Unpin had once been a retainer of that house, so there was no reason their reverence for the court should be in any way deficient, Tokutomi Sohō adds.OriginalOriginal
Sakai further writes that he had lately been troubled that those in charge of the shogunate showed little reverence for the court, and that “on the pretext of illness, I had long been withdrawn and in seclusion,” pleading sickness, when he heard with astonishment that a provisional treaty had been signed at Kanagawa.Original
He then names Hotta Masayoshi and Matsudaira Tadakata as the chief instigators of the signing, and states that when both men were dismissed from office the next day, he “felt somewhat pleased.”OriginalOriginal
Why, then, did he serve as a spy for Ii within the castle?Original
Though he claimed to have been in seclusion, was he not exchanging letters with Ii and visiting him in person?Original
“Was he not himself a fox of the same den as those he denounced as men who idly clung to comfort and expediency?”Original
This asks whether he himself was not a fox of the same den as those he had denounced, the men who indulged in momentary ease.OriginalOriginal
This document reached Kyoto around the thirteenth day of the seventh month, and according to Sanjō Sanetsumu’s own record, a copy arrived from Konoe Tadahiro on the fourteenth, and it was viewed in the strictest confidence before the emperor.Original
It must have been received in Kyoto with an air of informal goodwill, and this is likely why Nagano and others later denounced it as “too lenient,” Tokutomi Sohō observes.OriginalOriginal
There was one more person troubled by this reappointment.Original
Umeda Unpin.Original
A former retainer of the Sakai house, now a rōnin.Original
“Should you give your consent to the Lord of Hikone, you will be called an enemy of the court, and will incur for all generations the name of a traitorous retainer.”Original
This means that if one agreed with the Lord of Hikone, one would be an enemy of the court and would bear the name of a traitor for ten thousand generations.Original
A separate paper even states that the retainers have “no choice but to resolve, one and all, to cut open their bellies.”Original
This means that there is nothing left but the resolve for all to commit suicide together.OriginalOriginal
Sohō’s Criticism of the Draft Treaty Document
Even Ii, for all his resolve, felt inward shame over signing without imperial sanction, Tokutomi Sohō writes.Original
Ii himself said, “It turned out very badly,” and “Even I was appalled.”OriginalOriginal
On the sixteenth day of the seventh month, a draft of the document Manabe was to carry to Kyoto was completed, and it was slightly revised in the office chambers.Original
This is the most essential document showing how they tried to justify themselves, Tokutomi Sohō says.OriginalOriginal
With the invention of the steamship, “even the ends of the earth have become like neighbors,” and there was no prospect of victory even if hostilities were opened now.Original
It also states that trial would be made at Kanagawa, Nagasaki, Hakodate, and Niigata, with Hyōgo to follow in five or six years, and the gains and losses to be seen within thirteen or fourteen years.Original
“Weighing one side against the other, in the end, since military preparedness is insufficient, the treaty is permitted for the time being”—this is Tokutomi Sohō’s summary.Original
Tokutomi Sohō laments that they did not more boldly declare that opening the country was advantageous to Japan and in keeping with the general trend of the world.OriginalOriginal
And what Tokutomi Sohō criticizes most is the reasoning that follows.Original
If friendly relations are maintained with each country until the year set for treaty renegotiation, Japan’s trade goods will grow scarce, the various countries will be unable to share the profit equally, and some will try to steal a march by concluding special arrangements.Original
At that point Japan will occupy an advantageous position, will show the virtue of the imperial line to win them over, and “will be able to control them rather than be controlled.”OriginalOriginal
Please consult the original page images for this source.
Open the original page at the National Diet Library“Utterly bizarre,” Tokutomi Sohō says.Original
Is it not inevitable that production of a profitable trade good will increase—all the more so for tea and raw silk, he says.Original
The draft further states that countries bringing tribute goods will be rewarded doubly in trade, that disrespectful countries will be controlled by conspiring with obedient ones, and goes so far as to say “the ancient state of holding the Three Han in our grip should be restored.”Original
This means a return to the ancient days when the Three Han were under Japan’s control.Original
“The further one reads, the more marvelous it gets,” “a far too glib tone”—so Tokutomi Sohō writes, judging it to be a thousand leagues inferior to the memorial of Hotta and Iwase.Original
If they truly believed it, it is folly; if it was a mere pretext, it is cunning—one of the two must be true, is Tokutomi Sohō’s verdict.OriginalOriginal
The Error in the Underlying Spirit
Why did this draft come into being?OriginalOriginal
In the vanguard was the shoshidai Sakai Tadaaki.Original
The commanding general of the strike force was Manabe Akikatsu.Original
His supporting wings were Ogasawara Nagato no kami, who had moved from magistrate of Uraga to city magistrate of Kyoto on the fifth day of the sixth month, and Naitō Bungo no kami, magistrate of Fushimi, who was ordered to take charge of policing the court on the eleventh day of the seventh month.Original
And it was Nagano Yoshikoto who was the real architect behind the shape of the purge, Tokutomi Sohō writes.OriginalOriginal
In the seventh month of Ansei 5 (1858), the Ii faction was at the height of its power.Original
By concealing the shogun’s death, Ii was able to rule the realm under the guise of carrying out the shogun’s will as his own.Original
Only Kyoto would not bend to his will.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō surmises that Ii divided Kyoto into three elements—the emperor, the court nobles, and the men of spirit among the commoners—and, judging that the court nobles were swayed by rōnin and the emperor by the court nobles, resolved on a hunt for rōnin.Original
The emperor had his own views and a sense of responsibility.Original
Tokutomi Sohō says that the idea that suppressing the men of spirit among the commoners would bring the court under control however one wished was mistaken.Original
Tokutomi Sohō also suggests that Ii’s remark to Hashimoto Sanai, relayed by the shogunate official Hirayama Kenjirō, that “there is also the precedent of Jōkyū,” may have been carried along by the momentum of the moment.OriginalOriginal
Tokutomi Sohō’s “most impartial judgment” is that the greater part of the responsibility for the Bogo Purge lay with the shogunate, and within the shogunate, with Ii.Original
Nariaki, though a “troublesome relative,” had no intention of destroying the main house.Original
The notion of “Mito’s rebellion” was a phantom conjured by the opposing faction.OriginalOriginal
云はゞ反對派の所謂る「水戶殿御謀反」と云ふは、全く反對派の幻影であつた
Open the original page at the National Diet LibraryIn the preface, Tokutomi Sohō writes that a great minister of a nation must make it his first principle to hold to impartiality for the sake of the realm.Original
Because Ii had from the outset emerged as the commanding general striking against the Mito faction, everything he did was derived from that underlying spirit.Original
“That underlying spirit was, above all, mistaken.”OriginalOriginal
The twelfth day of the sixth month, the day Utsugi Rokunojō visited Manabe’s residence.Original
Who was it that chose so rash an envoy?Original
Was the one who wrote the scenario really not rash himself?OriginalOriginal
| Source text | Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 40: The Ansei Purge, part 1 (1935). National Diet Library Digital Collections (PDM). PID 1223987 |
| Checked against | Ishin shiryō kōyō, vol. 2. PID 1046669 |
| Dates and names | All 21 dates in the text exist in the calendar for their year, and the Western years given alongside them agree. Of the 16 people named in the text, 11 also appear in Ishin shiryō kōyō, vol. 2. |
| English gates | 137 of 137 sentences passed the checks on the English text. |
This article is a reading of Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, vol. 40: The Ansei Purge, part 1. Tokutomi Sohō’s views are those of the 1920s and 1930s and may differ from current scholarship. The source text is a century old and may differ from current scholarship.
